In Suguitan (Re), the Court set aside a transfer at undervalue order under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act because the trustee’s counsel had previously represented the bankrupt in the same proceeding.

In Borok v. Primmum Insurance Company, the Court allowed the appellant insurer’s appeal from the application judge’s dismissal of the request for approval of a proposed SABs settlement for a party under disability pursuant to Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

In El Sherif v. Bakr, the appellant husband appealed a family law trial decision, claiming that the trial judge erred in determining issues relating to ordering retroactive support, the equalization calculation, and the amount of income imputed to the respondent wife. The Court allowed the appeal, in part, finding that the trial judge erred in ordering retroactive child and spousal support during the five-year period between separation and trial, during which the parties cohabited and the husband paid all the family expenses, as he had done before separation. The Court dismissed the other grounds of appeal.
Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Suguitan (Re), 2026 ONCA 738

Keywords: Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Transfers Under Value, Fiduciary Duties, Lawyers, Duty of Loyalty, Duty to Avoid Conflicts of Interest, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 96(1)(b)(ii), Canadian National Railway Co. v. McKercher LLP, 2013 SCC 39, MacDonald Estate v. Martin, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1235, R. v. Neil, 2002 SCC 70, Re Suguitan, 2023 ONSC 6801, Law Society of Ontario, Rules of Professional Conduct, Toronto: LSO, 2000

Borok v. Primmum Insurance Company, 2026 ONCA 748

Keywords: Contracts, Insurance, Motor Vehicle, Statutory Accident Benefits, Civil Procedure, Settlements, Approval, Parties Under Disability, Jurisdiction, Procedural and Natural Justice, Right to be Heard, Statutory Interpretation, Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010, O. Reg. 34/10, Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, s. 268, 280 and 398, Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sched. G, s. 11, Automobile Insurance, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 664, s. 9.1 and 18, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 134(1)(a), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 7.08, Law Society of Ontario, By-Law 4, ss. 6(1)-(2), Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Stegenga v. Economical Mutual Insurance Company, 2019 ONCA 615, Yang v. Co-operators General Insurance Company, 2022 ONCA 178, R.W. Tomlinson Limited v. Labourers’ International Union of North America, Local 527, 2025 ONCA 861, Wu Estate v. Zurich Insurance Co. (2006), 268 D.L.R. (4th) 670 (Ont. C.A.), D.V. v. Cordocedo, 2026 ONCA 705, S.E.C. v. M.P., 2023 ONCA 821, Ruetz v. Morscher & Morscher (1996), 28 O.R. (3d) 545, (S.C.), Kwok (Litigation guardian of) v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2016 ONSC 7339, Bellama v. Trafalgar Insurance, 2023 ONSC 172, Wang v. Safety Insurance Company, 2026 ONSC 3237, Gidda v. Intact Insurance Company, 2023 ONSC 2799, Gomez v. The Personal Insurance Co., 2025 ONSC 7049, Charles (Litigation Guardian of) v. Gore Mutual Insurance Company, 2023 ONSC 7053, Spicer v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2023 ONSC 3221, Saadati v. Moorhead, 2017 SCC 28

El Sherif v. Bakr, 2026 ONCA 752

Keywords: Family Law, Child Support, Spousal Support, Imputing Income, Retroactive Support, Post-Separation Cohabitation, Property, Remedies, Equalization of Net Family Property, Civil Procedure, Requests to Admit, Evidence, Admissions, Witnesses, Adverse Inferences, Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.3 (2nd Supp.), s. 15.1 and 15.2, Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175, Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/9, r. 22 and 23(1), Henry v. Boyer, 2018 ONSC 6858, Wharry v. Wharry, 2016 ONCA 930, Sypher v. Sypher (1986), 2 R.F.L. (3d) 413 (Ont. C.A.), Nielsen v. Mccabe, 2026 ONSC 530, Backstein v. Backstein, 2024 ONSC 5008, D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37, Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, Splett v. Pearo, 2011 ONSC 5329, Jama v. Basdeo, 2020 ONSC 2922, Smith v. Noel, 2023 ONSC 6682, Monte v. Monte, 2026 ONSC 4300, Ahmadi v. Heydari, 2018 ONSC 2682, Champoux v. Jefremova, 2021 ONCA 92, Serra v. Serra, 2009 ONCA 105, Rajan v. Rajan, 2014 ONSC 5383, Forget v. Forget, 2001 CarswellOnt 3271, Hagopian v. Kechichian, 2026 ONSC 4405, Tscherner v. Farrell, 2014 ONSC 976, Bruno v. Dacosta, 2020 ONCA 602, Schuringa v. Svetkoff, 2026 ONCA 682

Short Civil Decisions

Ferrari Estate v. Sukhram, 2026 ONCA 745

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Civil Procedure, Administrative Dismissals for Delay, Setting Aside

Wolf v. Wolf, 2026 ONCA 747

Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Trial, Costs, Enforcement, Support Debt, Family Responsibility Office

Suznevich v. Giesbrecht, 2026 ONCA 749

Keywords: Family Law, Parenting, Variation, Material Change in Circumstances

Appgear Mortgage Investment Limited Partnership v. Longobardi,
2026 ONCA 751

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time

Sui v. Toronto (City), 2026 ONCA 754

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Vexatious Litigants, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 140, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 2.1, Sui v. Attorney General of Ontario, 2024 ONSC 2813, Sui v. Ontario, 2022 ONSC 5604

CIVIL DECISIONS

Suguitan (Re), 2026 ONCA 738

[Trotter, Zarnett and Madsen JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S. Morrison, acting in person

H. Manis and D. Litsos, for the respondent

Keywords:Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Transfers Under Value, Fiduciary Duties, Lawyers, Duty of Loyalty, Duty to Avoid Conflicts of Interest, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 96(1)(b)(ii), Canadian National Railway Co. v. McKercher LLP, 2013 SCC 39, MacDonald Estate v. Martin, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1235, R. v. Neil, 2002 SCC 70, Re Suguitan, 2023 ONSC 6801, Law Society of Ontario, Rules of Professional Conduct, Toronto: LSO, 2000

facts:

J.L.S. retained M.L. for assistance in preparing a proposal to creditors. The proposal was rejected, which deemed J.L.S. bankrupt. M.L. later became counsel for the trustee, the respondent.
The respondent applied under s. 96(1)(b)(ii) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”) for a declaration that J.L.S. made a transfer at undervalue, alleging that less than five years before his deemed assignment into bankruptcy, J.L.S. transferred his one-half interest in a Florida property to his wife, the appellant, for nominal consideration, with the intent to defraud, defeat or delay a creditor.
At the motion, the appellant advised the motion judge that M.L. had previously provided advice to J.L.S. about the motion. M.L. said nothing in response. The issue was never addressed again. The motion judge ultimately found that the conditions for establishing a transfer at undervalue were established.
During the hearing of the appeal, the appellant argued that because the respondent’s application under s. 96 of the BIA required proof of dishonest conduct on the part of J.L.S., M.L. was necessarily acting directly against their former client’s interests. The respondent argued that any alleged conflict of interest was irrelevant to the transfer of the Florida property or any of the motion judge’s factual findings, and that the motion judge addressed the conflict issue when the appellant raised it after the hearing.

issues:

1. Did M.L., the respondent’s counsel, act in conflict of interest and/or breach its fiduciary duty to not act against their former client’s interests?
2. Was the conflict issue adequately addressed at the hearing?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

1. Yes.

   The Court ultimately held that M.L. owed J.L.S. a continuing duty of loyalty which was not honoured, as M.L. switched sides during the same proceeding. Judges possess an inherent jurisdiction to disqualify lawyers from acting in the face of a conflict of interest. Disqualification may be justified for reasons other than to avoid the risk of improper use of confidential information, such as the need to maintain the repute of the administration of justice.

   The Court rejected M.L.’s argument that no confidential information from J.L.S. was used on the motion. The Court provided two reasons. First, the question is not whether confidential information will be or has been used, it is whether there is a risk that it might be used. Second, the Court emphasized that the duty of loyalty extends further than just the risk of improper use of confidential information and includes a much broader principle of avoidance of conflicts of interest. The duty of loyalty is engaged even in the absence of confidentiality concerns. The Court held that by representing the respondent in the very bankruptcy proceeding that arose as a consequence of the matter for which M.L. was retained, M.L. was acting adversely to J.L.S interests of J.L.S.

   The Court also noted that M.L. did not seek J.L.S.’s consent to represent the respondent trustee in the ensuing litigation. M.L. submitted that though consent was not obtained, no one raised any objection to M.L.’s representation of the respondent trustee in any of the two earlier, related proceedings. The Court rejected this argument, as the failure to raise an earlier objection did not equate to consent.

2. No.

The Court held that when the conflict was raised by the appellant during the hearing, M.L. failed to apprise the motion judge of the underlying circumstances. The appellant attempted to raise the conflict issue with the motion judge. The Court found that based on the information that was available to the motion judge, he was right to assume there was no conflict, but M.L. should have clarified the issue, especially in view of the fact that the appellant and J.L.S. were self-represented.

Borok v. Primmum Insurance Company, 2026 ONCA 748

[Huscroft, Trotter and Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

E.K. Grossman and R.B. Greer, for the appellant

A.M. Lee, for the respondent

M.S. Rastin, J.M. Golosky, and A. Voudouris, for the intervener Ontario Trial Lawyers Association

P.G. Samworth, for the intervener Canadian Defence Lawyers

K. Bryan, for the intervener Public Guardian and Trustee

Keywords: Contracts, Insurance, Motor Vehicle, Statutory Accident Benefits, Civil Procedure, Settlements, Approval, Parties Under Disability, Jurisdiction, Procedural and Natural Justice, Right to be Heard, Statutory Interpretation, Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010, O. Reg. 34/10, Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, s. 268, 280 and 398, Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sched. G, s. 11, Automobile Insurance, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 664, s. 9.1 and 18, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 134(1)(a), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 7.08, Law Society of Ontario, By-Law 4, ss. 6(1)-(2), Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Stegenga v. Economical Mutual Insurance Company, 2019 ONCA 615, Yang v. Co-operators General Insurance Company, 2022 ONCA 178, R.W. Tomlinson Limited v. Labourers’ International Union of North America, Local 527, 2025 ONCA 861, Wu Estate v. Zurich Insurance Co. (2006), 268 D.L.R. (4th) 670 (Ont. C.A.), D.V. v. Cordocedo, 2026 ONCA 705, S.E.C. v. M.P., 2023 ONCA 821, Ruetz v. Morscher & Morscher (1996), 28 O.R. (3d) 545, (S.C.), Kwok (Litigation guardian of) v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2016 ONSC 7339, Bellama v. Trafalgar Insurance, 2023 ONSC 172, Wang v. Safety Insurance Company, 2026 ONSC 3237, Gidda v. Intact Insurance Company, 2023 ONSC 2799, Gomez v. The Personal Insurance Co., 2025 ONSC 7049, Charles (Litigation Guardian of) v. Gore Mutual Insurance Company, 2023 ONSC 7053, Spicer v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2023 ONSC 3221, Saadati v. Moorhead, 2017 SCC 28

facts:

A.B. was injured in a motor vehicle accident in February 2017 and he is a person under disability under the Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”). A licensed paralegal was retained to negotiate the resolution of A.B.’s claims for statutory accident benefits under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010, O. Reg. 34/10 (“SABS”).

The parties arrived at a proposed resolution and signed Minutes of Settlement. A Notice of Application for approval of this proposed settlement was issued in the Superior Court of Justice on January 30, 2023. An affidavit from the paralegal was included with the initial Application Record, and an affidavit of solicitor was filed in support of the application in June 2025. The application record was assigned to the application judge to review.

On August 21, 2025, the application judge issued an endorsement that erroneously stated that no solicitor’s affidavit had been included in the application record and he adjourned the application, directing that an affidavit from a solicitor be filed. In an endorsement dated September 9, 2025, the application judge acknowledged that the affidavit of solicitor was in the record, but he expressed concerns that the lawyer had not actually negotiated the proposed settlement. He directed that the Public Guardian and Trustee (“PGT”) be served with the application record and that counsel attend a “one-hour formal hearing” before him.

The hearing was convened on December 5, 2025. The application judge reiterated his concerns that the solicitor filing the affidavit was also required to have been involved in the negotiation of the proposed settlement and could not be retained simply to obtain court approval. The issue of jurisdiction of the Superior Court to approve a settlement of SABS claims was not raised at the hearing. Nevertheless, the application judge dismissed the application, finding that r. 7.08 does not apply to the proposed resolution of claims for SABS and that the Superior Court does not have jurisdiction to approve proposed settlements of any SABS claims, as they are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (“LAT”). The application judge dismissed the application without hearing submissions from the parties on his own initiative.

The appellant insurer appealed the application judge’s dismissal of the request for approval. The respondent and the interveners agreed that the decision must be set aside. The parties further requested that the Court approve the proposed settlement.

issues:

1. Did the application judge err in finding that the Superior Court of Justice did not have jurisdiction to approve the proposed settlement because it involved the resolution of claims under the SABS, which was the exclusive jurisdiction of the LAT?
2. Did the application judge err in finding that a lawyer must negotiate the proposed settlement for the party under disability and file an affidavit confirming same?
3. Was the application judge’s decision procedurally unfair?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

1. Yes.

   The Court found that the application judge misunderstood the purpose of r. 7 of the Rules, the parens patriae jurisdiction of the court and s. 280 of the Insurance Act, and held that the Superior Court has jurisdiction to review and approve a settlement of claims arising from SABS.

   Rule 7.08(1) of the Rules provides that no settlement of a claim involving a person under disability is binding without the approval of a judge. After reviewing the required materials for a motion or application for approval, the judge must determine, based on the evidence, whether the proposed settlement is in the best interests of the party under disability and ought to be approved.

   The application judge misunderstood s. 280 of the Insurance Act. He found that the LAT had “exclusive jurisdiction” over all things related to SABS, including a proposed settlement. The application judge also erred in law by concluding that s. 280 granted the LAT exclusive jurisdiction over all matters relating to SABS, including the approval of proposed settlements.

   The Court clarified that s. 280 of the Insurance Act deals with the procedure to be followed when there is a dispute concerning an insured person’s entitlement to a benefit or the quantum of a benefit, and that it grants exclusive jurisdiction to the LAT over disputes arising from ongoing claims related to SABS, not to settlements. S. 280 of the Insurance Act does not address proposed settlements of SABS claims for parties under disability. If the jurisdiction of the Superior Court is to be taken away, the statute must do so in clear and unequivocal language. The Court found that s. 280 had not done so respecting the approval of settlements under r. 7.08.

   Further, s. 9.1 of the Automobile Insurance regulation of the Insurance Act addresses proposed settlements of SABS claims and sets out a highly regulated procedure when a settlement is entered into. Section 9.1(6) states specifically that certain aspects of the procedure set out in the Automobile Insurance regulation do not apply to settlements that have been approved by a court pursuant to r. 7 of the Rules. This makes it clear that for the proposed settlement of a SABS claim that involves a party under disability, the procedure is to file materials pursuant to r. 7 and seek approval from the Superior Court, in the same way that all proposed settlements involving parties under disability are done.

   Obtaining court approval of proposed settlements for parties under disability is mandatory in every civil case. The Court highlighted the protective purpose of court approval under r. 7.08, including the Court’s parens patriae jurisdiction to ensure that the rights of infants and other legally disabled are protected. The Court emphasized that judges of the Superior Court have approved and continue to approve proposed resolutions of SABS claims of parties under disability pursuant to r. 7.

2. Yes.

   The application judge erred in finding that a lawyer must negotiate the proposed settlement for the party under disability and file an affidavit confirming this. The Court held that paralegals can negotiate a resolution of a claimant’s SABS claims.

   Rule 7 does not require a lawyer to participate in the settlement negotiations for a party under disability. It simply requires that as part of the material filed in support of the approval motion or application, an affidavit of solicitor acting for the litigation guardian be filed, which must set out the lawyer’s position in respect of the settlement. The Court held that there is no prohibition against paralegals who are licensed by the Law Society of Ontario dealing with SABS claims on behalf of clients who are under a disability. While paralegals are prohibited from dealing with settlements of SABS claims for parties who have been catastrophically impaired, this case did not involve a claimant who had been designated catastrophically impaired.

3. Yes.

   The Court found that there was procedural unfairness in the application judge’s decision. The application judge failed to advise the parties that he was considering dismissing the approval application on the basis that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction. Instead, he convened an oral hearing because of concerns he had about a paralegal negotiating a proposed settlement of a claim for SABS on behalf of a party under disability, and with the lawyer swearing the affidavit being retained after the settlement negotiations.

   The issue of jurisdiction of the Superior Court over SABS settlements was not raised by the parties, nor was it raised by the judge at the hearing. The Court held that the application judge ought to have advised the parties and the PGT that he was considering dismissing the application for lack of jurisdiction. The first notice that the parties had that the judge had a concern about his jurisdiction to approve the proposed settlement was when his reasons dismissing the application were released. It was manifestly unfair to the parties to proceed in this fashion, particularly given the fact that counsel were following the established procedure for approval of proposed settlements pursuant to r. 7.08, along with Practice Directions and best practices for these motions and applications.

El Sherif v. Bakr, 2026 ONCA 752

[Paciocco, Sossin and Madsen JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M.J. Stangarone and J. Farshait, for the appellant

A.E.S., acting in person

Keywords: Family Law,  Child Support, Spousal Support, Imputing Income, Retroactive Support, Post-Separation Cohabitation, Property, Remedies, Equalization of Net Family Property, Civil Procedure, Requests to Admit, Evidence, Admissions, Witnesses, Adverse Inferences, Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.3 (2nd Supp.), s. 15.1 and 15.2, Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175, Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/9, r. 22 and 23(1), Henry v. Boyer, 2018 ONSC 6858, Wharry v. Wharry, 2016 ONCA 930, Sypher v. Sypher (1986), 2 R.F.L. (3d) 413 (Ont. C.A.), Nielsen v. Mccabe, 2026 ONSC 530, Backstein v. Backstein, 2024 ONSC 5008, D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37, Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, Splett v. Pearo, 2011 ONSC 5329, Jama v. Basdeo, 2020 ONSC 2922, Smith v. Noel, 2023 ONSC 6682, Monte v. Monte, 2026 ONSC 4300, Ahmadi v. Heydari, 2018 ONSC 2682, Champoux v. Jefremova, 2021 ONCA 92, Serra v. Serra, 2009 ONCA 105, Rajan v. Rajan, 2014 ONSC 5383, Forget v. Forget, 2001 CarswellOnt 3271, Hagopian v. Kechichian, 2026 ONSC 4405, Tscherner v. Farrell, 2014 ONSC 976, Bruno v. Dacosta, 2020 ONCA 602, Schuringa v. Svetkoff, 2026 ONCA 682

facts:

The parties married in Egypt in 2000 and have three children. The wife and the husband separated in August 2019, and the wife commenced her family law application in 2020 seeking an order related to all legal issues arising from separation. The wife sought the payment of child and spousal support. The parties cohabited for over 5 years between their separation and trial, and the husband paid for the wife and children’s expenses during that time.

At issue during the trial was the extent and value of certain assets and debts in Egypt, on both the date of marriage and separation. The parties did not agree on the value of a villa in Alexandria (the “villa”), the husband’s alleged interest in and claimed debt to a company called El-Aqsa, and the value of a Mahr at the date of separation. The husband served three Requests to Admit under r. 22 of the Family Law Rules. The wife responded to two of them, but not the Request to Admit dated October 24, 2024 (the “October Request”). The facts requested to be admitted included the value of the husband’s claimed debt to El-Aqsa on the date of separation and the value of the Mahr.

In her final order, the trial judge established the parties’ incomes for support purposes; determined child and spousal support, including retroactive support; determined equalization; ordered post-separation adjustments; and directed that the matrimonial home be sold. The appellant husband appealed, submitting that the trial judge erred in ordering retroactive support, determining the equalization calculation, particularly by not giving effect to deemed admissions arising from the wife’s failure to respond to the October Request, and the quantum of income imputed to the respondent wife

issues:

1. Did the trial judge err in ordering retroactive support for periods during which the parties continued to cohabit after separation?

2. Did the trial judge err in her determination of the equalization amount owing by:

a. Failing to consider the wife’s deemed admissions arising from her failure to respond to the October Request?

b. Misapprehending evidence in relation to the villa and by drawing an adverse inference for failure to call a particular witness?

3. Did the trial judge err in her determination of the quantum of income to be imputed to the wife prospectively?

holding:

Appeal allowed, in part.

reasoning:

1. Yes.

The Court held that neither retroactive child nor retroactive spousal support payable from the parties’ 5-year post-separation cohabitation period should have been ordered and set aside that portion of the order below.

At trial, when a claim is made for retroactive child and/or spousal support for periods of post-separation cohabitation, during which a payor covered family expenses, the analysis is expansive and involves a more comprehensive review of the basis of entitlement and of the record is required. It is an assessment of whether, overall, the objectives of support were met by the ongoing payment of expenses during cohabitation. There may be cases where ongoing payment of family expenses during post-separation cohabitation met the recipients’ day-to-day needs but did not result in a “fair standard of support” in the case of child support or did not address the compensatory basis for spousal support under the Divorce Act. In addition, the court’s discretion to order retroactive support will be guided by the D.B.S. and Kerr factors. The Court held that in applying the D.B.S. and Kerr principles in the context of a claim for retroactive child and/or spousal support for a period of postseparation cohabitation, the court should consider: the basis for entitlement, incomes of both parties, Child Support Guidelines and SSAGs amounts, expenses paid compared to before separation patterns, whether needs and support objectives were met, any blameworthy conduct by the payor, changes in net worth, if either party would experience a windfall due to the order or absence of an order, hardship to the payor, and whether the recipient provided notice that their needs or those of the children were not being adequately met.

The trial judge found that the husband covered all the expenses for the wife and the children during the 5 year post-separation cohabitation period. The wife did not give notice before trial that either her needs or the children’s needs were not being adequately met. The Court set aside the retroactive support order based solely on the wife’s failure to provide notice. Even if notice had been provided, the circumstances did not support the order made, considering that: the husband paid all household expenses as he had during the marriage, paid amounts roughly matching the Child Support Guidelines and SSAG figures, his net worth did not change and he did nothing blameworthy, while the wife would have received a windfall from the support order made by the trial judge and hardship to the husband was a realistic concern. Overall, the husband’s payments to maintain the family post-separation met the “fair standard of support” given the parties’ means, and as contemplated by the objectives of both spousal and child support.

2. No.

The Court rejected both of the husband’s submissions on this ground of appeal.

a. Deemed Admissions

The husband submitted that the trial judge erred in the net family property calculation and in her determination of the equalization amount payable to the wife. His primary submission was that she failed to consider the wife’s deemed admissions arising from her failure to respond to the October Request in her analysis. In particular, he said she should have given effect to the deemed admission as to the value of his debt to El-Aqsa and the value of the Mahr at the date of separation.

The purpose of Requests to Admit under r. 22 of the Family Law Rules are to narrow the factual issues in dispute and make the family litigation process more efficient and cost-effective. The practical effect of an admission under r. 22 is that a party will generally not be permitted to lead evidence that contradicts their admission and a court is bound to act on this admission, even if other evidence contradicts it. If a party fails to respond to the Request to Admit, or seeks to withdraw their admission, the court is entitled to consider the context of the case and the conduct of the parties. The court will engage in a three-part inquiry: (1) whether the proposed withdrawal raises a triable issue; (2) whether the admission was inadvertent or resulted from mistaken instructions; and (3) whether the withdrawal will result in non-compensable prejudice to the other party. The overriding factor is whether it is in the interests of justice to permit the withdrawal.

On the first day of trial, the husband raised the issue of the wife’s failure to respond to the October Request. The wife submitted that she was self-represented when she received it, that it comprised over 250 questions, that it contained nothing new, and that from her perspective, the husband’s purpose was to waste her time and to exhaust her. On appeal, the husband asserted that two specific deemed admissions ought to have been treated as dispositive when the trial judge determined his net family property for equalization purposes, the first relating to the Mahr, and the second relating to a claimed debt to El-Aqsa. The court below deferred the issue of addressing the Requests to Admit until after the trial, which the Court found was not ideal. However, a review of the record led to the conclusion that the trial judge accepted the wife’s submissions regarding the context of the extensive and repeated Requests to Admit and treated the wife’s submissions as a request to withdraw the deemed admissions arising from her failure to respond to the October Request. While it would have been preferable for the trial judge to have (1) documented, in a written ruling, her application of the three-part inquiry described above, or (2) directly addressed the Requests to Admit in her Reasons for Decision, the Court was unable to conclude that the trial judge erred. Her reasons had to be read in the context of the record as a whole, and where the trial reasons “do not explain the ‘what’ and the ‘why’, but the answers to those questions are clear in the record, there will be no error”.

Regarding the husband’s alternative positions, the Court found that the trial judge did not err in rejecting the expert’s evidence demonstrating an alleged debt to El-Aqsa, and by not determining a value for the Mahr, for which neither party provided evidence of value as of the date of separation. The trial judge considered the evidence before her and made findings of fact, which was within her discretion and was accordingly owed deference.

b. Misapprehension of Equalization Evidence

The husband submitted that the trial judge erred by misapprehending evidence relating to the villa when calculating his net family property and erred in law by drawing an adverse inference against him for failing to call a specific witness. The Court held it would not interfere with the trial judge’s findings on these issues, as she had ample evidence before her to support her conclusions, despite the fact that she commented on the husband’s failure to call a witness from the developer to confirm or deny his ownership of the villa at separation.

3. No.

The Court did not accept the husband’s submissions that the trial judge erred in her imputation of income to the wife. The Court held that these submissions essentially asked for a reweighing of the evidence before the trial judge regarding the wife’s earning capacity. There was no reviewable error in either the analysis of imputation or in the conclusion ultimately reached.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Ferrari Estate v. Sukhram, 2026 ONCA 745

[Huscroft, Dawe, Bownstone JJ.A]

Counsel:

P. Di Monte, for the appellant

J. Juda, for the respondents Re/Max Ultimate Realty Inc. and D.D.

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Agreements of Purchase and Sale of Land, Civil Procedure, Administrative Dismissals for Delay, Setting Aside

Wolf v. Wolf, 2026 ONCA 747

[Thornburn, Coroza, Dawe JJ.A.]

Counsel:

N. Wilson, for the appellant

T.L. Simionati and B.M. Thompson, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Trial, Costs, Enforcement, Support Debt, Family Responsibility Office

Suznevich v. Giesbrecht, 2026 ONCA 749

[Coroza, Gomery, Osborne JJ.A.]

Counsel:

L. Belowus, for the appellant

S. Timerman and M. Battaglia, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Parenting, Variation, Material Change in Circumstances

Appgear Mortgage Investment Limited Partnership v. Longobardi, 2026 ONCA 751

[Monahan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

K.S. Randhawa, for the appellant/moving party

E. Babayev, for the respondent/responding party Appgear Mortgage Investment Limited Partnership

No one appearing for respondent/responding party T.B.C.

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Perfection, Extension of Time

Sui v. Toronto (City), 2026 ONCA 754

[Sossin, Madsen, Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

HS, acting in person

D. Westcott, for the respondent

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Vexatious Litigants, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 140, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 2.1, Sui v. Attorney General of Ontario, 2024 ONSC 2813, Sui v. Ontario, 2022 ONSC 5604