In Rheeder v. Gray et al, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed a district court’s denial of motions for summary judgment brought by the City of Marion and former Marion Police Department employees, defendants in a suit by a former custodian for the Marion Police Department. Under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), the Court did not find the plaintiff’s claim of harassment “sufficiently severe or pervasive,” nor her claim of retaliation “to [be] a materially adverse action.” Consequently, the Court remanded the case for dismissal.

Valerie Rheeder, the plaintiff and a former custodian for the Marion Police Department, alleged defendant Douglas Slagle, Marion Deputy Chief at the time, engaged in inappropriate behavior while she was an employee. Rheeder alleged Slagle spoke to and texted her in a sexually suggestive manner on several occasions. Additionally, Rheeder claimed Slagle made physical contact with her a few times, stating Slagle “would seek opportunities to shake her hand,” during which “Slagle would linger longer than necessary.” Rheeder also asserted Slagle once “put his right cheek against her cheek.” Because of these interactions, Rheeder met twice with Slagle to express her discomfort. In one meeting, Slagle allegedly “stated that his intent was not sexual in nature.” In another, Rheeder claimed “Slagle agreed to stop.”

Rheeder asserts her exchanges with Slagle made her “ill, vomit, and miss a day of work.”

Rheeder later made a complaint against Slagle. After investigating, the Police Department told Rheeder, by memorandum, that Slagle was told to cease discussing anything beyond work duties with her and that “the Chief of Police ha[d] directed both parties to cease all communications and contact.” Joseph McHale, another defendant, was Chief of Police at the time.

Following this investigation, Rheeder alleged having concerning interactions with Marion Police Department administrative manager Shellene Gray, another defendant. On one occasion, Rheeder claimed Gray said Rheeder should have made her report about Slagle to Gray while “gripp[ing] the top of Rheeder’s shoulders.” Another day, while Rheeder performed custodial work in an office, she alleges “Gray blocked the doorway,” demanding to know the other employees with whom Rheeder discussed her complaint and asserting, “[W]henever this gets out, . . . I’ll know who to get or who to come after.”

Because of these alleged exchanges with Gray, Rheeder reported to the City’s human resources department that she was experiencing a hostile work environment and retaliation. The City concluded “Gray had committed no ‘materially adverse employment actions’ against Rheeder and that Rheeder’s complaint was ‘unfounded.’” The City also promised Rheeder would not have to converse individually with Gray moving forward. Rheeder did not continue working for the City thereafter.

Rheeder ultimately sued under the ICRA for retaliation and sexual harassment. Rheeder alleged Slagle created a hostile work environment through sexual harassment and that the City permitted Slagle’s behavior, both in violation of Iowa Code section 216.6. Moreover, Rheeder alleged McHale, the City, and Gray violated Iowa Code section 216.11 through retaliation. At the district court level, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted as to the constructive discharge portion of Rheeder’s retaliation claim; however, the remainder of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment was denied.

Relying on the Court’s 2017 decision in Haskenhoff v. Homeland Energy Solutions, the Court outlined the elements a plaintiff must prove for an ICRA claim of hostile work environment caused by sexual harassment: “(1) she ‘belongs to a protected group,’ (2) she ‘was subjected to unwelcome harassment,’ (3) ‘the harassment was based on a protected characteristic,’ and (4) ‘the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment.’”

The Court determined the district court erred by denying the defendants’ motions for summary judgment regarding Rheeder’s claims of a hostile work environment due to sexual harassment. Referencing the Court’s 2018 decision in State v. Watkins, the Court asserted Slagle’s alleged behavior was not sufficiently “severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment” when the circumstances were viewed in their totality from “an objective reasonable-person perspective,” a requirement for the fourth element. To support this position, the Court noted Slagle’s alleged behavior lacked “physical threats or humiliations,” involved “minimal touching,” and included distinct occurrences as opposed to repetitious and continual behavior. However, the Court noted it found “sufficient evidence that [Rheeder] felt subjectively harassed.”

The Court then outlined the elements a plaintiff must prove for an ICRA retaliation claim, citing its 2021 decision in Rumsey v. Woodgrain Millwork, Inc.: “(1) [s]he was engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) [s]he was subjected to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection between [her] participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Referencing its 2021 decision in Godfrey v. State, the Court noted “a materially adverse action . . . (1) produces an actual injury or harm that is (2) sufficiently severe to ‘dissuade a reasonable person from making or supporting an allegation of discrimination or harassment.’”

Ultimately, the Court held the defendants should have prevailed on summary judgment on the claims of retaliation. The Court did not find McHale’s memorandum, which was sent to Rheeder following the Slagle investigation, to be an adverse action as Rheeder did not indicate it caused her “injury or harm,” nor did it alter her “hours, pay, professional advancement, duties, or status.” Further, the Court found Gray’s behavior was not a materially adverse action as Rheeder’s person or property were not damaged by Gray, her “employment conditions” were not altered by Gray, and the threats made by Gray were imprecise, so the Court was unable to identify them as “threats of something that would be objectively injurious or harmful.”

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