The Iowa Supreme Court entered opinions in ten cases in February 2025. At the links immediately below, you can read Rox Laird’s analysis of the following opinions:
Allen Diercks v. Scott County, et al., concerning the applicability of the Iowa Open Records Act;
Marleny Rivas v. Derek Brownell, concerning the Supreme Court’s ability to extend the statute of limitations in civil cases during the COVID-19 pandemic;
State of Iowa v. Ezekial Lawrence Kieffer, concerning the constitutionality of a firearms prohibition under Iowa Code Chapter 724;
In the Interest of N.F., concerning the restoration of an individual’s firearm rights.
The remaining opinions from February are summarized below.
State of Iowa v. Taylor Christopher Smith, No. 24-0053
Opinion date: February 14, 2025
On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County
Issues:
- Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a fine greater than the statutory minimum for third-degree sexual abuse.
- Whether a notice of firearm prohibition based on felony conviction is unconstitutional under the Iowa or United States Constitution.
In May 2021, Taylor Smith was charged with third degree sexual abuse after he performed sexual acts with a fourteen-year-old. The district court ordered Smith to serve a term of incarceration not to exceed ten years and imposed a $1,370 fine with a 15% criminal services surcharge and a $90 sexual abuse surcharge. The district court also issued a notice of firearm prohibition pursuant to Iowa Code § 724.31A because Smith was convicted of a felony. In June 2020, when Smith committed the crime, the applicable statutory range for the fine was $1,000 to $10,000. The increased range of $1,370 to $13,660 went into effect in July 2020. Smith raised two arguments on appeal. First, Smith argued the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a $1,370 fine because it mistakenly believed the range was $1,370 to $13,660. Second, Smith argued the notice of firearm prohibition was unconstitutional.
The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the fine portion of Smith’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. The Court held that evidence on the record supported the conclusion that the district court believed the fine had to fall within the new range of $1,370 to $13,660. The Court noted that criminal defendants are to be sentenced based on when the crime was committed, not based on the law in effect at the time of sentencing. Therefore, the Court held that, although the $1,370 fine fell within the applicable range of $1,000 to $10,000, the district court abused its discretion in imposing the fine because it mistakenly believed $1,370 was the minimum fine available. The Court did not reach the merits of Smith’s firearm prohibition notice challenge because the issue was not properly preserved for direct appeal. Justice Oxley authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.
Jessenia Burton et al., v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Company, No. 24-0030
Opinion date: February 14, 2025
On interlocutory appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County
Issue:
- Whether psychological test material can be disclosed in civil discovery in a personal injury case to anyone other than a licensed psychologist.
Jessenia Burton was injured in a student driver’s education course when another vehicle hit her vehicle. Burton filed suit against several defendants including West Bend Mutual Insurance Company. Burton retained a neuropsychologist who created a report concerning several psychological and neuropsychological tests administered to Burton after the accident. The neuropsychologist concluded Burton would likely suffer permanent mild deficits in intellectual and executive functioning. After Burton disclosed the report, West Bend requested all tests, worksheets, and other documents prepared for Burton during her neuropsychological evaluation. Burton resisted the discovery request, arguing Iowa Code § 228.9 prevented the disclosure of the psychological test material and test data to anyone other than a licensed psychologist. However, the district court granted West Bend’s motion to compel. The district court reasoned Iowa Code § 228.6(4)(a) provides that mental health information may be disclosed in a civil proceeding when an individual offers their mental or emotional condition as an element of a claim. Burton applied for interlocutory appeal.
The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order granting West Bend’s motion to compel. The Court found the language of Iowa Code § 228.9 to be plain and unambiguous. The statute indicated that psychological test material and records associated with the test material cannot be disclosed in a judicial proceeding subject to one exception that allowed psychological test material and all associated records to be disclosed to a licensed psychologist. The Court rejected the district court’s finding that § 228.6(4)(a) created an exception to this rule. Justice McDonald authored the opinion of a unanimous court.
State of Iowa v. Gerry Harland Greenland, No. 21-1425
Opinion date: February 14, 2025
On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals
Issue:
- Whether Greenland’s conviction for assault on persons engaged in certain occupations is necessarily included in and merges into his conviction for attempt to commit murder.
In May 2019, sheriffs were called to Gerry Greenland’s property after a disagreement between Greenland and his nephew had escalated. Greenland had affixed two “bale spears” to the front of his tractor and was chasing his nephew, brother, and a hired farmhand around the property. Bale spears are metal rods about five to six feet long that were capable of being raised and lowered. Sheriff Ben Boswell and two other peace officers arrived to the scene emergency lights activated. With the bale spears raised about three feet off the ground, Greenland advanced down the driveway and swerved the tractor into the front driver’s side of Sheriff Boswell’s squad car. The bale spears punctured the vehicle causing the door of the vehicle to crumple and become pressed against Sheriff Boswell’s body. Greenland then pushed the squad car, with Sheriff Boswell inside, down the driveway and eventually driving the tractor and squad car into a ditch.
The district court found Greenland guilty of attempt to commit the murder of Sheriff Boswell, assault on persons in certain occupations—a peace office Sheriff Boswell—with intent to cause serious injury while using a dangerous weapon, and simple misdemeanor assault on his nephew. Greenland appealed, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and that the district court erred in failing to merge his convictions because assault on persons in certain occupations is a lesser included offense of attempt to commit murder. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed Greenland’s convictions, finding there was sufficient evidence to uphold Greenland’s convictions. The Court of Appeals also held that the convictions did not merge because the attempt to commit murder and the assault were based on “separate and distinct actions.” Greenland sought further review.
The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgement of the district court. The Court only reviewed Greenland’s argument that his convictions for assault on persons in certain occupations and attempt to commit murder should merge pursuant to Iowa Code § 701.9. The Court held that Greenland’s convictions for attempt to commit murder and assault on persons in certain occupations did not merge. The Court reasoned that, under the elements test, the greater offense of attempted murder did not completely overlap assault on persons in certain occupations while using or displaying a dangerous weapon. Thus, merger was not required. Justice McDonald authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.
Michael Chandler, et. al. v. Iowa Department of Corrections , No. 24-0189
Opinion date: February 21, 2025
On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County
Issue:
- Whether peace officers have a right to sue their employing agency, the Iowa Department of Corrections, under Iowa Code Chapter 80F.
The plaintiffs in this case—peace officers working for the Iowa Department of Corrections—were each disciplined after an administrative investigation by their employer. After the Department imposed its discipline, the officers requested copies of witness statements and investigation reports involved in their cases, but they alleged the Department refused to turn the documents over as required by Chapter 80F. Iowa Code Chapter 80F provides that if an administrative investigation results in disciplinary action against an officer, “copies of any witness statements and the complete investigative agency’s report shall be timely provided to the officer. . . upon request at the completion of the investigation.” Iowa Code § 80F.1(13) also describes an officer’s right to sue, allowing an officer to bring a cause of action against any person, group of persons, organization, or corporation for damages arising from the filing of a false complaint. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department reasoning that chapter 80F grants the officers no right to bring a cause of action against a state agency.
The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department. The Court rejected the officer’s argument that the word “person” as used in the statute required the application of the expansive definition of “person” found in Iowa Code § 4.1(20). Rather, the Court applied the ordinary definition of person—referring to an individual human—and concluded that chapter 80F only created a cause of action against a natural person, group of persons, organization, or corporation, and not a state agency. Justice McDermott authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.
Estate of Larry Joe McVay v. Grinnell Regional Medical Center, No. 23-0243
Opinion date: February 28, 2025
On interlocutory appeal from the Iowa District Court for Poweshiek County
Issue:
- Whether the Iowa Supreme Court had the authority to extend the statute of limitations in civil suits during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The question presented and arguments made in this case are nearly identical to those made in Rivas v. Brownell. Thomas McVay, sued several hospitals and a doctor to recover damages for alleged medical malpractice that resulted in his father’s death. Thomas’s father died on November 24, 2018, and he did not file the suit until February 5, 2021, after the two-year statute of limitations had expired. However, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Iowa Supreme Court tolled all statutes of limitations seventy-six days for claims that would have otherwise expired between March 17, 2020 and December 31, 2020. With the seventy-six-day tolling period, the deadline for this case would have been February 8, 2021.
The district court denied the medical provider’s motion for summary judgment, concluding the Supreme Court possessed the power to toll the deadline in its supervisory order and thus that Thomas filed the lawsuit within the tolled limitation period. The medical providers sought interlocutory appeal. For the same reasons set out in Rivas v. Brownell, the Court concluded that tolling the statute of limitations during the COVID-19 pandemic fell within the constitutional authority vested in the Supreme Court. The opinion was not to be published. Justice McDonald authored a concurring opinion and Justice May authored a dissent for reasons set forth in Rivas v. Brownell.
Hunter Three Farms, LLC v. Richard Hunter, No. 22-1601
Opinion date: February 28, 2025
On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals
Issue:
- Whether a majority of the voting members of a limited liability company can authorize the company to file suit against another voting member of the company to recover funds the nonconsenting member allegedly owed the company.
Brothers Robert, Gary, Richard Hunter were longtime farmers and farm operators. The brothers did business together in a limited liability company, Hunter Three Farms, LLC. The brothers each owned twenty voting units of the LLC and Hunter of Iowa, Inc. owned forty nonvoting units. In 2018, Richard submitted a claim to the Syngenta Corn Seed Settlement Program on behalf of “Hunter Farms” without telling his brothers the program existed or that he was making the claim. Richard received a $62,467.91 settlement payment and deposited it into an account to which Robert, Gary, and the LLC did not have access. Robert and Gary then voted to have the LLC file a direct action against Richard, without Richard’s consent, to recover the settlement proceeds owed to the LLC. Richard filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the LLC lacked standing to sue him. The LLC filed its own motion for summary judgment, arguing standing was not an issue in the case and, instead, asserted that the LLC had the authority to file suit against Richard based on a majority vote of the members because a lawsuit to recover funds owed to the LLC was within the LLC’s ordinary course of activities.
The district court granted Richard’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case, reasoning that the litigation was not in the scope of the LLC’s ordinary course of business activities and that the decision to file action against Richard required the unanimous approval of all voting members, including Richard. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s ruling. The Court of Appeals held that an LLC may sue one of its member-managers under exceptional circumstances if all disinterested members—here Gary and Robert—authorized litigation.
The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversed the district court judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court first clarified that the LLC did have standing to sue because the LLC had a specific legal interest in the settlement funds and suffered injury when Richard allegedly converted the settlement funds. The Court determined that because the LLC was not governed by an operating agreement, Robert and Gary’s authority to authorize the LLC to recover the settlement proceeds was governed by the default provisions of the Iowa Code. The Court ultimately found that the act to recover money owed to the company was an action in the ordinary course of activities. Therefore, a majority of members of the LLC could authorize the LLC to file the suit, and the LLC had the authority to file the suit. Justice McDonald authored a unanimous opinion of the Court, except for Justices McDermott and May, who took no part in the decision.
[Disclosure: Nyemaster Goode attorneys Spencer Cady and Brianna Long represented the appellee Richard Hunter in in this case.]
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