In State v. Cullum, the Iowa Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reviewed a district court’s decisions to deny a motion to suppress, to deny a motion for a new trial, and to not suspend fines in an appeal sought by a criminal defendant. Judge Greer wrote the majority opinion in which the Iowa Court of Appeals conditionally affirmed the defendant’s convictions, but partially vacated and remanded the sentences. Judge Buller and Judge Langholz specially concurred. Judge Ahlers authored a partial dissent and partial concurrence, which was joined by Chief Judge Tabor and Judge Sandy.

A Mason City police officer observed an idling vehicle that was registered as belonging to a woman with a suspended license. When the policeman noticed the vehicle traveling away, he attempted to stop the vehicle to learn more about if the driver had a valid license, turning on his emergency lights. This led to the vehicle accelerating, causing a high-speed chase that concluded when the vehicle ended up lodged in a bank of snow. At this point, police officers discovered the driver’s seat was occupied by defendant Jacob Cullum.

Cullum was charged with driving while barred, second-degree criminal mischief, and felony eluding following initiating a high-speed chase after an attempted traffic stop. He moved to suppress traffic-stop evidence, asserting the police lacked reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. The district court denied this motion.  A jury found Cullum guilty on all charges. Cullum was then sentenced to “incarceration not to exceed five years on the criminal-mischief charge, not to exceed two years on the driving-while-barred charge, and not to exceed five years on the eluding charge.” Cullum was to serve the sentences sequentially for an overall period no greater than twelve years. He was also issued fines for each charge, totaling $2,905.

Reviewing Cullum’s motion to suppress, the court of appeals noted Cullum’s story differed from the officer’s story. Cullum asserted that the inside lights of his car were on and that his car was located in a well-lit location, providing enough of a chance for the police officer who drove by to realize that a woman was not operating the vehicle. As such, Cullum argues the ensuing police stop “lacked reasonable suspicion, [so] all evidence obtained after the attempted stop should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful seizure.”

However, the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. In support of its position, the court of appeals pointed to the totality of the circumstances and afforded deference to credibility determinations by the district court. The court of appeals further indicated that the evidence did not back up an assertion that the officer knew what the driver looked like prior to trying to stop the car. The court also stated, “[E]ven if the basis for the traffic stop had been unlawful, Cullum’s flight from law enforcement provided probable cause that he committed a new crime.”

As to Cullum’s motion for a new trial, the Iowa Court of Appeals relied on the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in State v. Wickes to examine the standard that should be used at the district-court level: “whether a greater amount of credible evidence suggests the verdict rendered was a miscarriage of justice.” The Iowa Court of Appeals noted that in evaluating the weight of the evidence, judges necessarily must assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh the different pieces of evidence against one another. In this case, the court of appeals determined that the district court erred by utilizing an incorrect standard as it “deferr[ed] to the jury’s factual assessment instead of weighing the evidence itself.” Consequently, the portion of the motion-for-a-new-trial ruling dealing with whether the defendants’ verdicts stood in opposition to evidentiary weight was reversed and remanded so the district court could utilize the appropriate standard.

Turning to Cullum’s sentence, the court of appeals outlined that when analyzing a sentence for abuse of discretion, the court examines if the reasons for the selected “sentence are either clearly untenable or unreasonable.” The district court believed it was unable to suspend fines issued to a defendant as the defendant was not given probation. However, the court of appeals found the district court’s approach erroneous, asserting that the district court can suspend fines “in the absence of express language eliminating the sentencing court’s” ability to do so. Consequently, the court of appeals remanded the fines portion of the matter for resentencing.

In his concurring opinion, Judge Buller advocated for clearer sentencing statutes that specify whether fines should be waived or suspended when someone is incarcerated for a substantial time period.

In his own concurring opinion, Judge Langholz noted his agreement with the majority was based on the fact that the Iowa Supreme Court has viewed “a materially identical statute” to allow a district court to suspend fines, including when the district court does not give the defendant probation. However, Judge Langholz noted he saw “nothing in the words of the Iowa Code that gives a district court the power to essentially waive a fine by suspending it without also putting a defendant on probation.”

Judge Ahlers, joined by Judge Sandy and Chief Judge Tabor, concurred in part and dissented in part. While Judge Ahlers concurred with the majority as to the new-trial and suppression motions, Judge Ahlers did not agree with the majority’s holding as to vacating the sentence given to the defendant. Regarding the sentence, Judge Ahlers asserted that the district court did “not suspend the fines once the court decided not to place Cullum on probation” because it was “a legal requirement,” noting that while the district court had the option for fine suspension, selecting such an option would have necessitated that the defendant receive probation. Further, Judge Ahlers argued the fines were mandatory and unwaivable under the relevant statute. In response to Judge Langholz’ concurring opinion, Judge Ahlers argued that the Court of Appeals was not bound by the Iowa Supreme Court’s 1997 ruling in State v. Lee, because that case involved interpretation of a different statutory provision. Consequently, Judge Ahlers believed the court of appeals should have affirmed Cullum’s sentence.

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