In Lucas v. Warhol, the Iowa Supreme Court examined service of process in a matter involving a defendant who might not have been able to get mail due to experiencing homelessness. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice May, the Court held the district court properly denied the motion to dismiss the case and held the district court erroneously allowed for the defendant’s attorney to be served in lieu of the defendant.

Plaintiff Rhonda Lucas was rear-ended by defendant Peter Warhol in Des Moines on I-80, based on Lucas’s petition. Consequently, Lucas was injured. As a result of the car accident, citations were issued to Warhol, which included departing from the accident’s location.

Subsequently, Lucas brought suit against Progressive Direct Insurance Company, who carries underinsured-motorist coverage for Lucas. Lucas did not have issues serving Progressive Direct Insurance Company. However, she encountered obstacles to service as to Warhol. Among the service pathways attempted, Lucas hired a sheriff to serve Warhol in Minnesota; utilized a private investigator to locate where Warhol was living; and, as outlined under Iowa Code section 321.501 which prescribes an avenue for nonresident motorist service, served the Iowa Department of Transportation. Lucas then moved for additional time to serve Warhol, which was granted.

Then, the insurance carrier hired an attorney to represent Warhol in connection with the lawsuit. Subsequently, the attorney moved to dismiss after discovering “that Warhol was homeless and had nowhere to receive mail,” a motion which Lucas resisted. Lucas then submitted a notice of intent to seek a default judgment. In response, Warhol’s attorney filed a motion to strike, which Lucas resisted. Warhol’s attorney’s motion to strike and motion to dismiss were denied by the district court, holding “Warhol had been evading service and engaging in misleading conduct” and that Lucas could have more time to serve. Warhol’s attorney moved that the court reconsider regarding the denied motion to dismiss, which was also denied. Lucas also asked for permission to serve Warhol’s attorney rather than Warhol, a request which the court eventually allowed. After Warhol’s attorney was served, the attorney asked for interlocutory review. Personal service on Warhol was finally successful as the interlocutory review was pending.

The Iowa Supreme Court first outlined how service plays into the lifecycle of a lawsuit. Referencing Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 1.302(3), the Court noted a plaintiff must serve an original notice and a petition copy on the defendant after filing a petition. Further, the Court pointed out that Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 1.302(5) outlines “that ‘service of the original notice’ must occur ‘within 90 days after filing the petition,’” though with “good cause,” a court must afford the plaintiff additional time to serve the defendant.

While evaluating the district court’s denial of Warhol’s attorney’s motion to dismiss, the court noted the parties were aligned as to the propriety of the first grant of additional time. However, the parties disputed whether the second grant of additional time was proper. The Court stated that it did not perceive the evidence to sufficiently back an assertion that Warhol was dishonest or evading service. However, the Court ultimately affirmed that the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss was proper. In support of its holding, the Iowa Supreme Court pointed to the Lucas’s work in attempting to serve Warhol through a variety of methods, “her repeated efforts to obtain assistance from the district court,” and the parties’ perception that Warhol did not have a way to get mail due to homelessness.

Next the Court evaluated whether the service on Warhol’s attorney was an adequate substitute in lieu of serving Warhol. The Court noted that alternative service methods can be required by a court under the Iowa Rules for Civil Procedure if there are two prerequisites: (1) “the court must determine that ‘service cannot be made by any of the methods provided by’ rule 1.305,” and (2) “the method ordered by the court must be ‘consistent with due process of law’” per Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 1.305(14). While the Court believed the first prerequisite was likely achieved, it ultimately determined the district court should not have allowed the defendant’s attorney to be served in lieu of the defendant in this case. The Court noted that the question of whether service upon a party’s attorney is sufficient under the due process standard depends on the totality of the circumstances. However, here, the absence of factual support indicating Warhol had been in communication with his attorney or that his attorney was aware of how to get in touch with Warhol supported the conclusion that one could not simply assume that service upon the attorney would have provided Warhol with actual notice of the claims and the case.

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