The Iowa Supreme Court entered opinions in fifteen cases in March 2025. At the links immediately below, you can read Rox Laird’s analysis of the following opinions:

Miller and Dufner v. State of Iowa, concerning whether the 2022 Fraud in Assisted Reproduction Act (FARA) that created civil and criminal penalties for fertility doctors who fraudulently use their own sperm to help infertile couples conceive children through artificial insemination applied retrospectively.

The remaining opinions from March are summarized below.

 

Banwart v. Neurosurgery of North Iowa, P.C., No. 24-0027

Opinion date: March 7, 2025

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County

Issues:

• Whether the certificates of merit “affirmed” by Plaintiffs’ experts substantially comply with Iowa Code Section 147.140’s affidavit requirement.
• Whether Iowa Code Section 147.140 is void for vagueness.
• Whether the Defendants waived their rights under Iowa Code Section 147.140 for waiting 2.5 years to dispute the certificates of merit.

Marlene Banwart underwent a lumbar laminectomy on July 24, 2018, performed by Dr. David Beck at Neurosurgery of North Iowa, P.C. (NNI). After pain persisted past her expectations, she was evaluated on July 31 by Dr. Thomas Getta, and he did not refer Banwart for additional evaluation or surgery. On August 15, it was discovered via MRI that the surgery resulted in an epidural hematoma and Dr. Beck performed emergency surgery. Banwart and her spouse filed a medical malpractice action against NNI, Dr. Beck, and Dr. Getta more than two years later. On November 20, 2020, the Banwarts filed two certificates of merit affirmed by expert doctors. Both certificates referenced compliance with Section 147.140 of the Iowa Code, but neither certificate had the signatures of the experts notarized or signed under oath or under penalty of perjury. The certificates remained unchallenged through 2020, 2021, and 2022.

On July 7, 2023, the defendants jointly filed motions for summary judgment, arguing the two-year statute of limitations had expired (even with COVID extensions) and the affidavits were not in line with Iowa Code § 147.140(6). The Banwarts countered that accrual began with the August 15 MRI, their expert affirmations satisfied the “oath” requirement, equitable estoppel prevented belated challenges, and the statute is unconstitutionally vague. The district court held that the affidavits complied with the statute but that the case was filed outside of the statute of limitations due to the invalidity of the Supreme Court’s COVID-era supervisory orders. On appeal, the Banwarts disputed the district court’s conclusion that the supervisory provision was unconstitutional and ask for the affirmation of the district court’s ruling on their certificates complying with Section 147.140(6). The Banwarts also contended the 2.5-year delay in seeking summary judgment precludes defendant’s relief under section 147.140. The defendants urged an affirmation on the provision’s unconstitutionality while cross-appealing issues on the factual question of when the statute of limitations began to run, as well as the district court’s holding that the Banwarts were in substantial compliance with Section 147/140(6).

The Supreme Court bypassed the statute-of-limitations issues, reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, and remanded with instructions to grant the defendants’ motions under Iowa Code § 147.140(6) because the plaintiffs’ expert certificates—signed solely by affirmation—did not meet the statute’s notarization requirement and cannot be “substantially complied” with absent an oath or penalty-of-perjury clause. The Court also rejected the vagueness challenge, finding the mandate in § 147.140(6) clear and supported by Iowa precedent.

Nor did the Supreme Court find the defendants waived their right to relief under Section 147.40 by waiting 2.5 years to dispute the certificates. The court noted the defendants moved for summary judgment over a year before the dispositive motion deadline and trial date, and there was no deadline within Section 147.140(6). The Court held that defendants are allowed to control the timing of their motions for summary judgment within the confines of the motion deadline without risking the waiving of their rights. Justice Waterman delivered the majority opinion of the Court. Chief Justice Christensen, as well as Justices Mansfield, McDonald, and May, joined.

Justice McDermott, joined by Justice Oxley, filed a dissenting opinion. Justice McDermott argued the Banwarts substantially complied with Section 147.140(6) because written affirmation exposes the signer to penalties of perjury, which satisfies the purpose of the statute. Furthermore, it argued the Banwarts complied with Section 622.1(1), which allows a party to satisfy affidavit requirements without someone to administer an oath. The dissent would also reject the defendant’s argument on the statute of limitations on cross-appeal because of the disputes of material facts involved, agreeing with the district court. The dissenting Justices would reverse the summary judgment ruling against the Banwarts and remand for further proceedings.

 

J. Doe v. Iowa District Court For Polk County, No. 23-1662

Opinion Date: March 7, 2025

On certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issues:

• Whether Doe was entitled to the expungement of two parole violation records from 2006 and 2007 under Iowa Code Section 901C.2.
• Whether Doe is entitled, in the alternative, to a reclassification of the two parole violations such that they are given civil case numbers or at least nonfelony case numbers.

J. Doe was arrested in 2006 for allegedly driving while barred, at a time when he was on parole due to a prior conviction and sentence. His parole officer filed a preliminary parole violation report with the district court seeking an arrest warrant the next day, but then the day after that requested that report to be recalled and the warrant to be withdrawn because the matter had been disposed of pursuant to Section 908.6. The matter was assigned felony criminal case number FECR*****7. In 2007, about a month later, the parole officer filed another preliminary violation report and received another arrest warrant for Doe for driving while barred, failure to report arrest, and failure to attend mandatory meetings and appointments. The district court, two days later, had Doe transported to prison for a pending hearing for the revocation of his parole, assigned number FECR*****8. The 2006 charges have since been dismissed and the aggravated misdemeanor associated with those charges has been expunged.

In 2023, Doe applied to have FECR*****7 and FECR*****8 expunged through the Polk County District Court because if the 2006 charge had been expunged, then his related parole violation reports too should be expunged, or at least reclassified to not be felony criminal cases. After the court denied Doe’s request for expungement, Doe filed a motion to enlarge and amend, and the court denied expungement again as well as the reclassification. Doe sought appellate review with the Iowa Supreme Court and the Court granted the petition and retained the case.

In arguing for expungement, Doe cited Iowa Code Section 901C.2, which requires expungement upon meeting five requirements, but the one in issue was whether Doe’s criminal case had one or more charges in which he was acquitted or had all criminal charges dismissed. The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that parole violation revocation proceedings were not criminal charges, but a process of initiating administrative proceedings under Section 908. Furthermore, FECR*****7 and FECR*****8 are more connected to the preceding criminal case for which he was on parole, and that case has not been expunged. In arguing for expungement as a matter of public policy, the Court stated such policy cannot overcome statutory text, and the policy referenced only applied under Section 901C.2(1), which only applies to criminal cases, which the violation reports were not. The Court concluded Doe was not entitled to expungement.

The Court also agreed that certiorari relief is not available for reclassification. However, the Court was sympathetic to Doe’s concerns. The district court did not act illegally or exceed its jurisdiction when it declined reclassification. The Court annulled the writ. Justice Mansfield delivered the unanimous majority opinion of the Court.

 

State of Iowa v. Pirie, No. 23-04345

Opinion Date: March 7, 2025

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the district court abused its discretion when a judge did not recuse himself based on his past representation of the defendant and a comment the judge made during previous representation.
• Whether a police officer’s hearsay testimony affected the underlying fairness of trial or undermined confidence in the result.
• Whether the district court should have granted a motion by the defendant for a new trial.
• Whether the district court violated the defendant’s rights by conducting a remote sentencing proceeding without first obtaining his waiver of the right to in-person sentencing.
• Whether the district court abused its discretion by sentencing defendant to prison on a theft charge consecutive with a prison term for his probation violation.

Jason Pirie was convicted by jury of a theft in the third degree after stealing a bottle of tequila worth $55 from a Hy-Vee on August 3, 2022. There was store video camera footage capturing the theft, the two friends of Pirie who entered the store with him, and the car they drove to the Hy-Vee in. There was also a police officer who reviewed that store footage and then encountered the three individuals the next day and sought an arrest warrant for Pirie.

Six days before trial, Pirie filed a motion for recusal of the district court judge who in 2005 and 2016 had represented him prior to becoming a judge. A comment the judge made about Pirie taking a plea deal a year ago for a charge he was currently on probation for and how it was a good thing he did because otherwise it would not have been good left Pirie feeling concerned about bias. The district court denied that motion, noting that it was untimely. During the trial, the judge overruled a hearsay objection regarding a question asked to the police officer about the consistency of the version of events told to said officer by Pirie’s two friends. After the guilty verdict, Pirie filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds that a material witness was now available for trial. In a combined hearing for this motion, a contempt charge, a probation revocation, and a remote sentencing, the district court sentenced Pirie to a prison term not to exceed two years, to be served consecutive to the 180-day sentence he received as a part of his probation revocation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted Pirie’s application for further review, and affirmed.

On the issue of the motion for recusal, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial because Pirie could not show that the judge’s alleged bias and prejudice stemmed extrajudicially. Pirie could only speculate, and that was not enough. As to the comment, it was based on facts of that specific case and did not constitute a basis for a bias motion. The motion was never renewed. On the issue of the officer’s testimony, it constituted indirect hearsay, but the State could overcome the presumption of prejudice because of other overwhelming evidence of guilt through footage and testimony, so it was cumulative with other evidence and otherwise harmless. On the denial of a motion for a new trial due to unavailability of a material witness, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial because Pirie never informed the court until after the guilty verdict that he wanted his friend to testify. No continuances or other remedies were requested. He failed to preserve error on this issue. The Supreme Court agreed with the State on issues regarding remote sentencing because Pirie never objected to the remote proceeding and never filed a resistance when there were clear guidelines on how to do so. Regarding Pirie’s sentences, the Supreme Court affirmed because (1) the district court weighed multiple mitigating factors and did not put too much emphasis on Pirie’s criminal history, (2) the sentence was reasonable given the criminal history that incarceration was proper for maximum rehabilitation and community protection.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ opinion and the district court’s judgment and sentence. Chief Justice Christensen delivered the opinion of a unanimous court.

 

Waterloo Community School District v. Employers Mutual Casualty Company, No. 23-0321

Opinion Date: March 7, 2025

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issue:

• Whether the district court correctly construed an insurance contract to ascertain the coverage owed for a partial roof collapse.

An elementary school suffered a partial roof collapse from heavy snow. Subsequent investigations revealed that the load-bearing walls throughout the entire building had deteriorated mortar, making the building unsafe to occupy under the city of Waterloo’s standardized building codes. WCSD was not previously aware of this deterioration. The number of repairs needed to reach safe occupancy once again was large, and ultimately the Waterloo Community School District (WCSD) demolished the building to replace it with a new school building. The building was insured by Employers Mutual Casualty Company (EMC). WSCD submitted a claim to EMC requesting both costs to repair the area of the roof collapse and costs to address the deteriorated mortar throughout the entire building. EMC would not cover the latter because the Ordinance or Law (OL) provision stipulates that costs would not be covered if WCSD failed to comply with local codes before the collapse, and that the deteriorations rendered the building unsafe and not to code before the partial roof collapse. WCSD sued EMC for the cost to restore the deteriorated mortar through the entire building. The district court granted EMC’s motion for summary judgment such that EMC would only be responsible for damage physically caused by the collapse, pursuant to the OL provision EMC relied upon. WCSD applied for interlocutory review and the Supreme Court granted the application.

The Supreme Court found the OL provision was unambiguous and applied regardless of whether the insured had been cited for a building code violation before the collapse, and regardless of knowledge of pre-existing code violations. WCSD was required to comply with the building code before the collapse, but failed to do so. The Supreme Court reasoned that it would not rewrite the OL exception to contain a knowledge component.

The Supreme Court held the district court correctly interpreted and applied the OL exception to defeat WCSD’s claim. In terms of policy, holding otherwise would increase premium costs to insure older buildings. WCSD had not purchased OL coverage that included pre-existing code violations. The opinion did not discuss other grounds for denying coverage. The opinion was authored by Justice Waterman and joined by all justices joined except for Justice May, who took no part.

 

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Eichmann, No. 24-1494

Opinion Date: March 14, 2025

On appeal from the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission.

Issue:

• Whether an attorney violated the Iowa Court Rules and Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct resulting from issues with client communication, recordkeeping, and withdrawals from the trust account during her representation of a party in his dissolution of marriage action.

Carmen Eichmann was hired by Shane Pankonen in 2019 to represent him in the dissolution of his marriage. The divorce was contentious and heated. Pankonen made at least six request for billings and accountings over a six-month period, but, Eichmann produced no statements of her billings or any accountings provided to Pankonen regarding the trust account during the 2-year-plus span of representation. Eichmann withdrew funds from the trust account without written communication to Pankonen explaining the withdrawals. Eichmann never gave written notice to Pankonen about how certain payments he made were handled. Pankonen began requesting Eichmann for invoices, and Eichmann never responded. Eichmann at some point responded and disagreed that Pankonen had never received any billings, but did not attach an invoice. Eichmann was directed by the district court at a hearing to stay on the case until successor counsel filed an appearance, and when said counsel was retained and filed appearance, Eichmann still did not file a motion for withdrawal.

The client trust account balance remained at $2,715.82 until at least January 2023. Eichmann added a “disputed” notation to that balance on her trust transfer form in September of 2022, and eventually emptied the account to apply the funds to outstanding fees of Pankonen. Pankonen was under the impression he was owed $17,000 back, since he had no bills or invoices being sent to him. The Attorney Discipline Board filed a complaint against Eichmann in January of 2024, alleging nine rule violations of the Iowa Court Rules and Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. The Grievance Commission found the Board proved six violations and recommended a thirty-day suspension of Eichmann’s law license.

The Supreme Court affirmed Eichmann violated the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct rule 32:1.4(a)(4) on client communications because the record indicates she never responded to Pankonen’s six requests for information about the status of his bill he made over six months, and never provided him a written itemization of her billings throughout the entire representation.

The Supreme Court also affirmed the violation of Rule 32:1.15(e) on disputed funds because Eichmann labeled the remaining funds in the trust as disputed in September of 2022 and then eventually unilaterally withdrew those funds to pay herself without consulting or notifying Pankonen, without making an attempt to resolve said dispute.

The Supreme Court affirmed Eichmann violated rule 32:1.16(a)(3), regarding withdrawal from representation, because she failed to withdraw from representation after the appearance of successor counsel and after being terminated.

The Supreme Court affirmed Eichmann violated rule 32:1.15(f) and Iowa Court Rules 45.2(3)(a)(5) and 45.6(4), and held she violated 42.2(3)(a)(4), rules regarding recordkeeping, notice upon withdrawal of fee, and the maintenance of trust accounts. Eichmann failed to provide Pankonen with written notices when withdrawing funds or billing funds from the trust and failed to retain copies of the bills she was arguing she provided monthly. There was never a complete accounting as required.

The Supreme Court lastly held Eichmann violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(d) on deliverance of funds and rendering of accounting and Iowa Court Rule 45.2(2) regarding the same. Despite the fact that the disputed amount in the trust was not as much as what was owed to Eichmann by Pankonen, Eichmann was not entitled to receive the funds in dispute and should have kept them in a separate trust account until the dispute was resolved, and her withdrawal was a violation. She should have returned any funds Pankonen was entitled to receive and provided an accounting of the funds held in the trust as requested.

Rather than suspend Eichmann’s license, the Supreme Court issued a public reprimand after assessing aggravating factors of past conduct, substantial legal experience, treatment of the client, and attitude, along with mitigating factors such as representation and public service. Justice Oxley delivered the opinion on behalf of a unanimous Court.

 

Bright v. State of Iowa, No. 24-1019

Opinion Date: March 14, 2025

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County

Issues:

• Whether the 2022 Fraud in Assisted Reproduction Act (FARA) that created civil and criminal penalties for fertility doctors who fraudulently use their own sperm to help infertile couples conceive children through artificial insemination applied retrospectively.

Elizabeth Bright was born in 1958 after her parents., Barbara and Warren Steinkraus, underwent fertility treatment. It was not until many years later that Bright realized through Ancestry.com DNA testing that her biological father was not Warren, but Dr. John H. Randall, who assisted her parents with fertility treatments. Bright believed that Dr. Randall deceived her parents, and asserted a claim against the State, Dr. Randall’s employer at the time of the treatments, in 2023 under the newly enacted FARA. The district court dismissed her case because FARA lacked language to apply to fertility fraud before its enactment. The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the dismissal for the same reasons, applying the holding in Miller v. State.

For a more in-depth analysis, refer to Rox Laird’s analysis of Miller and Dufner v. State of Iowa, which concerns the same legal issue.

 

Stoughton and Myers v. State of Iowa, No. 24-1018

Opinion Date: March 14, 2025

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County

Issues:

• Whether the 2022 Fraud in Assisted Reproduction Act (FARA) that created civil and criminal penalties for fertility doctors who fraudulently use their own sperm to help infertile couples conceive children through artificial insemination applied retrospectively.

Ronald Stoughton and Rebecca Myers are siblings, born in the 1940s to parents Marlys and Clyde Stoughton, who sought fertility treatments with Dr. John H. Randall. Ancestry.com DNA testing revealed that Dr. Randall was the biological father of both Stoughton and Myers. Stoughton and Myers believed that Dr. Randall deceived their parents, and asserted a claim against the State, Dr. Randall’s employer at the time of the treatments, under the newly enacted FARA. The district court dismissed the case because FARA does not apply retrospectively to fertility fraud occurring before its enactment. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal for the same reasons, applying the holding in Miller v. State.

For a more in-depth analysis, refer to Rox Laire’s analysis of Miller and Dufner v. State of Iowa, which concerns the same issue.

 

Smith v. City of Cedar Rapids, No. 24-0864 

Opinion Date: March 14, 2025

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County

Issues:

• When an officer is entitled to certain investigative materials and immediate written results under Iowa Code Section 80F.1 of an internal investigation because of a complaint that may lead to discipline.

Police officer Antoine Smith had his official photos taken and displayed in 2009 when he was hired by the City of Cedar Rapids. In February of 2023, Smith was informed it was time to update the photos, but Smith did not want his photo retaken and displayed. After raising this concern with his captain, his captain ordered him to get his photo retaken within 5 days. Smith did not comply, so his captain filed a complaint against him. The interim chief of the department ordered a formal administrative hearing, of which Smith received notice on April 1, 2023. He was interviewed on April 13, 2023, where he agreed he violated the department’s code of conduct for officers by refusing the order. An investigative report was submitted to the disciplinary board, and about a week later, Smith’s counsel requested the results of the investigation and any materials pursuant to Iowa Code Sections 80F.1(3) and (9). Those requests were denied because the investigation was not deemed complete. The disciplinary board agreed with the findings of violation and recommended a ten-hour suspension without pay and a requirement for a new official photo. On May 18, 2023, Smith was notified his pre-disciplinary hearing would take place on the 25th, and further informed of his being found in violation and the potential for a suspension. Smith’s counsel’s second request for the same materials was denied. When the pre-disciplinary meeting occurred, Smith’s counsel raised objections regarding not receiving those documents, but the hearing proceeded, and Smith was suspended on May 31 and required to retake his photo. It was then that Smith was provided the complete investigation materials.

Smith brought an action in July of 2023 alleging the City violated Iowa Code Sections 80F.1(3) and (9), contending the materials should have been provided on April 18, when the investigative report was submitted to the disciplinary board, or, in the alternative, at least prior to the pre-disciplinary hearing on May 25. But the district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment and denied Smith’s because it agreed with the City that no duty to provide said materials occurred until May 31 when a final determination on the discipline was made.

The Supreme Court found that Section 80F.1(9) was clear that the right to provision of materials was conditioned upon the investigation resulting in a disciplinary action, such as a suspension. So, Smith’s right did not vest until the agency decided whether to impose discipline, which for Smith would have been May 31, when the decision to impose was made. Similarly, regarding Section 80F.1(3) on being notified in writing of the results of an investigation when it is completed, the Supreme Court held that an investigation is only completed when there is a determination of whether to impose discipline. This is because the Iowa Code, in defining a formal administrative hearing, includes that it may result in discipline, so there is an implication there must be a determination of whether to impose discipline. Therefore, Smith could not be entitled to the results of his investigation until May 31, when the decision to discipline was made. Otherwise, separating an agency’s investigation from its disciplinary decision could deplete reasonable time requirements and lead to line-drawing problems.

The Supreme Court therefore held that when the agency makes its decision on discipline, its investigation is complete. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of the City’s motion. Justice May delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

State of Iowa v. Gardner Jr., No. 24-0621

Opinion Date: March 14, 2025

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County

Issue:

• Whether the defendant was eligible for a deferred judgment under Iowa Code section 907.3(a)(1) when he was sentenced to a crime in one county, and then sentenced to a second crime in another county, with the crime in the second county actually having been committed first.

Ewaun Connor Gardner Jr. entered into a joint plea agreement in December 2023 that covered two offenses in Johnson County and one offense in Linn County. The Linn County offense occurred about three months prior to the Johnson County offenses. The district court denied Gardner’s deferred judgment requests in Johnson County in February 2024 and in Linn County in March 2024, finding his conviction in Johnson County, which occurred first to be a prior conviction under Iowa Code section 907.3(a)(1). The district court imposed suspended sentences with three years of supervised probation.

The Supreme Court determined the language of Section 907.3(a)(1) was not ambiguous and that a defendant will indeed be ineligible for a deferred judgment if he has a prior felony conviction, which Gardner had, regardless of when the offenses themselves were committed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that Gardner was ineligible for deferred judgment in Linn County because he was previously convicted of a felony in Johnson County. It therefore affirmed the sentence as well. Justice Christensen authored the opinion on behalf of a unanimous Court.

 

Harrison v. Mickey, No. 24-0373

Opinion Date: March 14, 2025

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issue:

• Whether use of force reports, routinely prepared by police officers whenever they use force, are covered by an exemption from disclosure of personal information in confidential personnel records in the Iowa Open Records Act, Iowa Code Section 22.7(11)(a), and Section 80F.1(20).

On March 27, 2022, Harvey Harrison submitted an open records request for 387 use of force reports submitted through the Des Moines Police Department in 2020. The City of Des Moines refused to produce the reports. The City argued said reports were personnel documents that were confidential and exempt from disclosure under Iowa Code Sections 22.7(11) and 80F.1(20). Harrison filed an action for writ of mandamus to compel the disclosure of the 387 reports, and later a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The court disagreed with the City’s labeling of the reports as self-reviews, finding that the reports were really just a report on the basic facts of incidents involving use of force by an officer.

Section 22.7(11) exempts from mandatory public record disclosure any personal information in confidential personnel records of government bodies as it relates to identifiable individuals such as officers. But, the Supreme Court held, the use of force reports are just reports of facts; they are not evaluative records and do not resemble confidential personnel records. The Supreme Court noted that if the reports were meant to be self-reviews, then officers would not be expected to complete the reports before shift ends, as was required. The reports are not typically kept within individual personnel files either.

The Supreme Court found Section 80F.1(20) had no application in this case because the confidentiality rules applied to the “statements” and “interviews”, which did not cover routinely generated use of force reports. The Supreme Court disagreed that production of these reports would jeopardize an ongoing investigation or present a clear and present danger.

The Supreme Court held Sections 22.7(11) and 80F.1(20) did not exempt the use of force reports from disclosure, and that the 2020 reports should be produced, affirming the district court’s judgement. Justice Mansfield delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court, except for Justice Waterman, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

 

Ruiz v. State, No. 24-0085

Opinion Date: March 14, 2025

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the district court properly dismissed an untimely second post-conviction relief application.
• Whether the adoption of equitable tolling for post-conviction relief applicants is appropriate when extraordinary circumstances outside the applicant’s control, including post-conviction relief counsel’s ineffectiveness, delay their applications beyond the three-year limitation.

In 2018, Brandon Ruiz was convicted on one count of second-degree sexual abuse, and with his new trial motion denied, he was sentenced to up to 25 years, a sentence affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 2019. Ruiz filed a post-conviction relief application (PCR) in January 2020 which was recast two years later and denied after a hearing in May 2022. During that hearing, Ruiz’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding inconsistent child testimony was denied. Said denial was upheld on appeal in July 2023 after the three-year statute of limitations for PCRS had ran. Ruiz filed another PCR alleging both ineffective counsel and actual innocence, but offered no additional facts. His appointed counsel never filed the needed brief, and after a hearing in November 2023, his PCR application was dismissed as untimely. The Court of Appeals affirmed that dismal, and the Supreme Court granted further review.

The Supreme Court did not consider the equitable tolling claim any further because he did not raise the issue at the district court level.

Ruiz maintained his counsel completely denied assistance at a crucial stage of proceeding because his appointed PCR counsel failed to present arguments on his behalf. Despite Ruiz’s failure to preserve error on his argument on appeal from his PCR denial, the merits of that argument were still analyzed. But his case was dismissed. It was time barred under Section 822.3 of the Iowa Code, and ineffective assistance in a first PCR application is not enough to extend the statute on a second PCR application. The Supreme Court did not speculate over what may have happened had Ruiz’s counsel made the argument he proposed about his first PCR counsel’s ineffectiveness. It still would have been time-barred. Furthermore, despite a claim of new facts in the second PCR application, Ruiz never listed them or discussed how they were previously unavailable. The record prevented the Supreme Court from determining what course of action Ruiz’s counsel took to address these alleged new facts. In Ruiz’s request to remand for further proceedings to give him an opportunity to develop claims at trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance, he does not state specific ways in which his counsel’s performance was inadequate and how competent representation would have changed the outcome.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the district court. Chief Justice Christensen delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

Kirlin and Kirlin v. Monaster, et. al, No. 24-0205

Opinion Date: March 21, 2025 (Amended May 29, 2025)

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County

Issue:

• Whether the district court abused its discretion in not finding good cause for the plaintiffs to make expert certifications that adhered to the second deadline but not the first deadline.

Jahn Kirlin alleged his physicians delayed ordering an MRI, altered medical records, and caused permanent disability after a chiropractic adjustment. His 2020 lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed because he filed a certificate of merit from the wrong type of medical expert. Kirlin re-filed in 2021 but the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants based on a defect in the certificate of merit in the first case. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in a prior appeal, holding the Kirlins had an absolute right to dismiss under Iowa Rule 1.943 and that refiling requires its own valid certificate of merit.

After procedendo in February 2023, the court held a March 30 scheduling conference but entered neither a new trial scheduling and discovery plan nor expert‐disclosure deadlines, and later set trial for March 18, 2024. The defendants’ subsequent summary judgment motions contended the Kirlins missed their Iowa Code § 668.11 expert-certification deadline. Plaintiffs promptly served such disclosures and argued the appeal tolled the deadline or good cause existed. The court ruled the original deadline still applied and granted summary judgment to defendants. Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court concluded the district court abused its discretion in not finding good cause under Iowa Code Section 668.11(2) for the Kirlins to make their expert certifications and disclosures on August 8, 2023, which was 223 days before trial. The Supreme Court considered the factors of (1) the existence of uncertainty and confusion as to the proper deadline after appeal and remand, (2) the lack of prejudice to the defendants, (3) diligence by the plaintiffs in pursuing their case, and (4) defense counsel’s actions. The confusion regarding the deadlines in this case was not plainly unreasonable, there was no actual prejudice suffered by the defendants detected, plaintiff’s counsel indeed pursued litigation with diligence (and an error in judgment in not seeking clarification does not amount to lack of diligence), and defendants’ counsel’s actions course of conduct did not support the district court’s ruling. While plaintiffs’ counsel was not blameless, these factors needed to be taken into account.

The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment entered by the district court and remanded for further proceedings. Justice Mansfield delivered the opinion on behalf of a unanimous Court.

 

Heartland Co-Op v. Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance Company, No. 23-0156

Opinion Date: March 21, 2025

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issue:

• Whether a provision in an insurance policy providing coverage to the insured for loss of earning and extra expense “for any one loss” subject to a limit of $3 million means $3 million per loss or $3 million in total earnings and extra expense coverage from once incident without regard to how many locations were impacted by said incident.

Heartland Co-Op’s several locations were damaged by a derecho in August 2020. It submitted an insurance claim to Nationwide reporting damage to 48 locations, and Nationwide paid $131 million. This included a $3 million amount for earnings and expense loss that was applied only once. Nationwide denied Heartland’s seeking of $3 million per location because it claimed the $3 million was a blanket limit to all covered locations as part of a single storm and single occurrence loss. Heartland sued Nationwide, and the parties submitted competing motions for summary judgment. The district court agreed with Nationwide that the combined total of its earnings and extra loss expenses was $3 million, resulting from one storm, applied entirely to all locations. It granted summary judgment and dismissed the case. The court of appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court concluded the relevant terms of the insurance agreement were plain and unambiguous. The policy provided coverage for loss of net income and extra expense to Heartland, as a result of the derecho. The limit of that coverage is $3 million as determined by the loss of net income and extra expense to Heartland for the total loss as a result of damage and business interruption at all covered locations and not the separate losses at each covered location. None of the specific locations identified in the schedule included a limit for earnings and extra expense coverage. The policy provided coverage for loss of income or for additional expense at the entity level. Heartland’s interpretation, given its premiums paid, would have been commercially unreasonable. Heartland’s internal accounting procedures did not prevail over the plain language of the insurance agreement and were not relevant to the number of losses. Furthermore, the policy contained a checkbox to provide the coverage Heartland sought and that checkbox was left blank.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the court of appeals and district court. The opinion was delivered by Justice McDonald and joined by all justices except Justices Waterman and May, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

 

State of Iowa v. Sievers, No. 23-0413

Opinion Date: March 28, 2025

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County

Issue:

• What constitutes “an initial disclosure” of sexual abuse from an alleged child victim under Iowa Code § 622.31B (2023).
• Whether “an initial disclosure” of sexual abuse means the first disclosure to any person of such abuse.

Leo (a pseudonym) told his mother in 2019 that her ex-fiancé, Allan Sievers, had sexually abused him as a child while they lived in his home when he was around 9, which led to Sievers being charged with two counts of second-degree sexual abuse and one count of lascivious acts with a child based on Leo’s testimony and a witness’s corroboration. At trial, the court admitted the hearsay of a friend of Leo, Nikki (a pseudonym), under Iowa Code § 622.31B, overruled objections regarding displaying Sievers’s nude-photo thumbnails to show sexual interest in children, and permitted cross-examination and a rebuttal witness friend of Sievers, Suhr, who was dressed in prison garb. The jury convicted Sievers on both sexual abuse accounts but not on the lascivious acts count. Sievers appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the admission of Nikki’s testimony, the admission of the nude photos, the appearance of Suhr in prison garb and shackles, and the sufficiency of the evidence. The Supreme Court retained the appeal.

Regarding sufficiency of evidence, the Supreme Court found that substantial evidence existed but that other prejudicial error in the case could still compel a reversal of the conviction. The Court did a plain meaning analysis of what “an initial disclosure” means under § 622.31B, concluding that the word “initial” held more value than the word “an” such that there could not be more than one initial disclosure, and that “an initial disclosure” means the first disclosure of sexual abuse. In this case, Leo told Malcom before he told Nikki, so Nikki’s hearsay testimony was not permitted under the statute in question or any other statute, and admission was erroneous. The presumption of prejudice to Sievers from this hearsay was not overcome because Nikki’s testimony was consistent with Leo’s, such that the State could not affirmatively show Nikki’s testimony did not affect the jury’s verdict.

The Supreme Court declined to address other points of error raised on appeal and reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. The opinion was delivered by Justice McDermott and joined by Justices McDonald, Oxley, and May. Chief Justice Christensen took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Justice Waterman, joined by Justice Mansfield, filed a lengthy dissent in which he would have affirmed the conviction and agreed with the State’s interpretation of “an initial disclosure” to mean that there can be more than one initial disclosure, and that it does not mean the first disclosure. Waterman argued the majority’s construction of the phrase was not in line with the purpose of the statute, which was to allow victims to corroborate their account of the abuse and dispel the inference that the delay in reporting the crime to authorities casts doubt. Justice Waterman also addressed other issues raised on appeal and would have held that (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State leeway on cross-examining Sievers, (2) that Sievers did not preserve error regarding the presentation of Suhr in prison garb, and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence photos of nudity found on Sievers’s computer.

 

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