The Iowa Supreme Court issued opinions in eleven cases in February 2026, At the links immediately below, you can read On Brief’s analysis of the following opinions:

The remaining opinions from January are summarized below.

Brea Anne Griffith, individually, as administrator of the Estate of Michael Lee Griffith, and on behalf of L.M.G., a minor, and Brian Griffith v. John L. Kulper and Travis J. Galloway, No. 24–0097

Opinion date: February 6, 2026

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

  • Whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence that the co-employee defendants had actual knowledge of the specific peril—missing gate pins—that caused a worker’s death to sustain gross negligence claims under Iowa Code section 85.20.

Michael Griffith died on the job after falling through an open catwalk gate into a lime surge hopper at a quarry operated by his employer, Wendling Quarries. A post-accident inspection revealed that the metal pins required to secure the gate were missing and had been replaced with a strip of wire. Griffith’s wife, Brea, and his father, Brian, sued three co-employees alleging gross negligence. A jury awarded approximately $2.84 million in damages against two of the defendants. The court of appeals affirmed, and the defendants sought further review.

The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals decision, reversed the district court judgment, and remanded for dismissal of the civil action with prejudice. The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove gross negligence because plaintiffs failed to prove the defendants had actual knowledge of the missing pins.

Under Iowa Code section 85.20, the workers’ compensation system is generally the exclusive remedy for on-the-job injuries, but a narrow exception permits tort claims against co-employees for gross negligence. To establish gross negligence, a plaintiff must prove three elements: knowledge of the peril to be apprehended, knowledge that injury was probable rather than merely possible, and a conscious failure to avoid the peril. The first and third elements require actual knowledge of the specific peril. Both defendants testified without rebuttal that they did not know the pins were missing or that the gate was unsecured.

The Supreme Court found that the court of appeals erred by relying on constructive knowledge, reasoning that Galloway’s cursory drive-by inspection showed what he should have discovered rather than what he actually knew. The Court noted that a failure to inspect is not, by itself, sufficient to prove gross negligence under Iowa law. Justice Waterman authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

Estate of Kara B. Tornell and Preston H. Tornell v. Trinity Health Corporation et al., No. 24–0720

Opinion date: February 6, 2026

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

  • Whether a nonlawyer estate administrator may prosecute a wrongful-death action in district court without an attorney.
  • Whether the district court erred by dismissing the lawsuit without granting the plaintiff’s request for time to retain counsel.

Kara Tornell died the day after she was admitted to the emergency department of a West Des Moines hospital. Her husband, Preston Tornell, a nonlawyer, was appointed administrator of her estate and filed a wrongful-death medical malpractice lawsuit against the hospital, clinics, and treating physicians. No attorney signed the petition or appeared in district court. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the case could not proceed without a lawyer for the estate. Preston argued he could represent the estate as sole beneficiary, or alternatively, that he should be given time to hire an attorney. The district court treated his pro se petition as a “legal nullity” and dismissed the lawsuit without granting time to retain counsel. A divided court of appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeal’ decision, reversed the district court’s dismissal, and remanded with instructions to grant Preston at least thirty days to retain trial counsel.

The Court held that a licensed attorney must represent the estate in a wrongful-death action, reasoning that estates are legal entities distinct from their administrators and that wrongful-death lawsuits involving claims of a surviving spouse and children require a lawyer’s professional judgment. The Court also identified potential conflicts of interest because the estate had at least one creditor and Kara was survived by Preston and their seven children, whose individual consortium claims also had to be brought by the administrator. However, the Court agreed with the dissenting judges below that Preston had preserved his alternative request for time to hire counsel and that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the case without granting that request. The Court rejected the view that Preston’s suit was a “legal nullity” because Preston was not authorized to represent the estate. Justice Waterman authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

State of Iowa v. Joshua Kelly Uranga, No. 23–1001

Opinion date: February 13, 2026

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

  • Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction under Iowa Code section 692A.105 for failing to register temporary lodging away from a principal residence when the defendant’s only residence changed.

Joshua Uranga, who has been required to register sex offender since 2002, was convicted of violating sex offender registration requirements for the second time, a class “D” felony. Iowa Code section 692A.104 requires a sex offender to register a change in residence. Uranga had registered an address in Pilot Mound as his residence, but authorities suspected he was not living there. He was evicted from that address on November 18, 2021, and testified that he moved to a new residence in Boone on November 19. He registered the new address on November 30. The State charged him under Iowa Code section 692A.105, which requires a sex offender to notify the county sheriff about temporary lodging away from the offender’s principal residence for more than five days. Uranga objected to jury instructions that he argued misstated the elements of the offense, but the district court overruled his objection. The court of appeals affirmed Uranga’s conviction.

The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal.

The Court reasoned that sections 692A.104 and 692A.105 impose different registration requirements. Section 692A.104 requires a sex offender to notify the sheriff within five business days of changing a residence—the requirement Uranga arguably violated. Section 692A.105, by contrast, is triggered only when a sex offender stays away from a principal residence for more than five days. The latter was the provision under which Uranga was actually charged. Because the evidence showed that Uranga’s principal residence changed from Pilot Mound to Boone within one to two days, the State did not prove that he was away from his principal residence for more than five days at any point during the relevant timeframe. The Court held that the State could not secure a conviction under section 692A.105’s temporary lodging provision based on conduct that, at most, violated section 692A.104’s change-of-residence provision, which the State did not charge. Justice Oxley authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

Amanda Cooke v. Iowa Department of Health and Human Services, No. 24–2031

Opinion date: February 13, 2026

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issues:

  • Whether the “reasonable and prudent person” standard for child supervision under Iowa Code section 232.68(2)(a)(4)(b) permits consideration of the caregiver’s role, training, and regulatory obligations as part of the “similar facts and circumstances.”

A five-month-old child died from anoxic brain injury after she was found with her face in a blanket while napping at Amanda Cooke’s registered childcare home. Cooke, a state-registered category “B” childcare provider, had placed the infant in a Pack ‘n Play in the basement—an area not approved for regular use—with a blanket draped over the side and no baby monitor. The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued a founded child abuse assessment, finding that Cooke denied the child critical care by failing to provide proper supervision. On judicial review, the district court reversed, concluding that the “reasonable and prudent person” standard is an objective “generic person” standard that cannot consider the caregiver’s training or professional status.

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order, upholding HHS’s founded child abuse assessment against Cooke.

The Court first determined that it owed no deference to HHS’s interpretation of the statute, because the “reasonable and prudent person” standard has independent legal meaning outside the agency’s expertise. Interpreting the statute without deference, the Court focused on the qualifying phrase “under similar facts and circumstances” in section 232.68(2)(a)(4)(b), concluding that those words must not be rendered superfluous. The relevant facts and circumstances include not only external factors like the child’s age and sleeping arrangement but also the circumstances under which the child came into the caregiver’s care—here, placement with a trained, compensated, state-registered provider who had agreed to follow specific safe sleep regulations. The Court found that HHS’s analysis properly considered objective circumstances common to all registered childcare providers rather than Cooke’s subjective beliefs, and thus upheld the assessment. Justice Oxley authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

Northwest Bank & Trust Company v. Pershing Hill Lofts, LLC, John M. Carroll, and John G. Ruhl, No. 22–1941

Opinion date: February 20, 2026

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

  • Whether an exclusivity clause in a nonbinding financing proposal was independently enforceable and, if so, whether the developer breached it.
  • Whether the district court abused its discretion by excluding the financing proposal from the fraud trial.

In 2015, Northwest Bank and developer Pershing Hill Lofts signed a financing proposal for a building redevelopment project in Davenport. The proposal was expressly a “summary of terms that may lead to a commitment to lend” and listed the award of Grayfield tax credits as a condition of the proposed loans. Its final paragraph contained an exclusivity clause in which the developer agreed to work solely with the bank in exchange for the bank’s due diligence efforts. After Pershing Hill did not receive the tax credits, the bank emailed the developer proposing either to “kill the deal” or proceed under materially different terms. Pershing Hill subsequently sought financing elsewhere. The bank sued for breach of contract and fraud. The district court granted summary judgment to Pershing Hill on the contract claim and excluded the financing proposal from the fraud trial, at which the jury found for the defendants. The court of appeals reversed on both rulings.

The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals decision and affirmed the district court judgment. Regarding the contract claim, the Court agreed that the exclusivity clause could be severed from the otherwise nonbinding financing proposal and was sufficiently definite to be enforceable, with a clear duty of exclusivity supported by consideration in the form of the bank’s due diligence work. However, the Court concluded that Pershing Hill’s duty of exclusivity was discharged when the condition underlying the proposed loan structure—the Grayfield tax credits—failed to materialize and the bank itself proposed to abandon or modify the deal. Because Pershing Hill did not seek alternative financing until after the credits were denied and the bank had abandoned the original terms, there was no breach as a matter of law.

Regarding the evidentiary ruling, the Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the financing proposal from the fraud trial under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403, reasoning that admitting the defunct proposal risked causing the jury to conflate the contractual exclusivity duty with the fraud claims. The bank was still permitted to present extensive testimony about the parties’ course of dealing. Justice McDermott authored the opinion of the Court, in which all participating justices joined. Justice Waterman took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

State of Iowa v. Sherral Jermaine Tolbert, Jr., No. 24–0971

Opinion date: February 20, 2026

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County

Issues:

  • Whether a district court’s acquittal-first jury instructions on murder and voluntary manslaughter misstated the law or violated the defendant’s constitutional rights.
  • Whether a prosecutor’s mention of specific punishments during voir dire constituted reversible misconduct.
  • Whether a prosecutor had a disqualifying conflict of interest based on prior employment in the public defender’s office.

Sherral Tolbert spotted Levonta Baker—a former friend turned rival gang member—driving in the direction of Tolbert’s grandmother’s house. Tolbert turned around and pursued Baker, pulling alongside Baker’s parked car and firing six shots, killing Baker. The State charged Tolbert with first-degree murder. Tolbert did not deny shooting Baker but argued he acted in the heat of passion, warranting only a voluntary manslaughter conviction. The district court gave acquittal-first instructions—directing the jury to consider lesser included offenses only if it first acquitted on the greater charge. The jury acquitted Tolbert of first-degree murder but convicted him of second-degree murder.

The Supreme Court affirmed Tolbert’s conviction for second-degree murder. Regarding the jury instructions, the Court held that malice aforethought (a deliberate intent to harm) and heat of passion are mutually exclusive mental states, meaning voluntary manslaughter is a true lesser included offense of murder rather than a form of mitigation that must be considered even after a murder finding. The Court noted that Iowa has used acquittal-first instructions for over a century and that this approach aligns with the majority of jurisdictions.

Regarding the alleged prosecutorial misconduct, the Court did not condone the prosecutor’s mention of specific punishments during voir dire, but ultimately found the remark insufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial. The trial court instructed jurors that they had “nothing to do” with the punishment.

Regarding the conflict-of-interest challenge, the Court upheld the district court’s finding that the prosecutor’s brief prior tenure in the public defender’s office did not give rise to a conflict, as the prosecutor was never assigned to Tolbert’s case and did not acquire any confidential information. Justice McDermott authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

State of Iowa v. Rodney Dee Brown, No. 24–0409

Opinion date: February 27, 2026

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

  • Whether jury instructions misstated the law by not requiring the term “illegal act” in the enticing-a-minor statute to be defined as an “illegal sexual act.”
  • Whether there was sufficient evidence of specific intent to commit an illegal act to support the conviction.

On April 8, 2023, thirteen-year-old Diya went to a supermarket to buy cleaning supplies for her father. Rodney Dee Brown, a seventy-one-year-old man, followed her through the store, repeatedly approached her, and then offered her a ride in the parking lot as she fled the store shaking and in tears. Diya recited Brown’s license plate number to her mother over FaceTime, and police later contacted Brown at his home. Brown admitted interacting with Diya but claimed she approached him, described her as a “pretty young girl,” and said he thought she was eighteen. Brown was indicted for enticing a minor under Iowa Code section 710.10(4). At trial, he objected to the marshaling instruction’s use of the undefined term “illegal act” and asked the court to specify the intended crime, but the court denied the request. The jury convicted Brown of the charged offense. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted further review.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and the district court judgment.

The Court rejected Brown’s challenge to the jury instructions, noting that section 710.10(4) does not require the intended illegal act to be a sexual act. The statute separately addresses sexually motivated offenses through a registration provision and a different subsection, section 710.10(2), that specifically criminalizes enticement with intent to commit an illegal sex act.

The Court also found that Brown’s course of conduct—following Diya, staring at her, repeatedly approaching her, and offering a ride despite her obvious distress—along with his contradictory statements to police, provided substantial evidence from which the jury could infer specific intent to commit an illegal act such as assault, kidnapping, or stalking. Chief Justice Christensen authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

Justice Mansfield filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice McDermott, expressing concern about the marshaling instruction’s failure to define “illegal act” for the jury. Justice Mansfield argued that the instruction should have specified the alleged illegal act or acts. However, he agreed that the court of appeals properly rejected the specific argument relating to the jury instructions that Brown raised on appeal.

Cody Lee Smith v. State of Iowa, No. 24–1296

Opinion date: February 27, 2026

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

  • Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on a postconviction relief application when the State’s motion was never served on the applicant and the applicant’s request for counsel was never acted upon.

Cody Smith pleaded guilty to assault while displaying a dangerous weapon and was sentenced to sixty days in jail. Approximately a year and a half later, Smith filed a pro se application for postconviction relief (PCR), along with a separate request for appointment of counsel. The PCR application was placed in a new case file, but the request for counsel mistakenly ended up in the old criminal file and was never acted upon. The State filed a motion for summary judgment on the PCR application but never served it on Smith, who was incarcerated and without an attorney. Months later, the district court granted the State’s unopposed motion. A divided court of appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded with instructions for further proceedings.

Under Iowa Code section 822.6, similar to the summary judgment provisions within the Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure, a party must be served with a motion for summary disposition of a PCR application must be given an opportunity to resist it before the court may rule. Because the State never served Smith with the motion, the Court held the resistance deadline was never triggered, and Smith had no opportunity to respond. The Court also noted that Smith, as a confined person, was excused from registering for electronic filing and could not be expected to monitor the court’s electronic docket for filings. The situation was compounded by the failure to act on Smith’s request for counsel. On remand, the Court directed the district court to consider Smith’s application for appointment of counsel and to ensure proper service of the State’s motion with an opportunity for Smith to respond. Justice Mansfield authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

Estate of Jill Cataldo by Zachary Mead v. RCHP-Ottumwa, LLC, Matthew Jay Breeding, and Elvin McCarl, No. 24–1994

Opinion date: February 27, 2026

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issues:

  • Whether the two-year statute of limitations for a wrongful-death action arising from medical malpractice begins to run when the injury and its cause are discovered during the patient’s lifetime, or only upon the patient’s death.

On January 25, 2021, Jill Cataldo went to Ottumwa Regional Health Center for a knee replacement. During her recovery, she was diagnosed with acute respiratory failure. Her doctor allegedly failed to detect a femur fracture on X-ray, and a male nurse allegedly fell on her, worsening the break. The fracture released fat emboli into her bloodstream, causing a pulmonary embolism. Cataldo was transferred to Iowa Lutheran Hospital on February 5, 2021, and died on February 17. Her estate filed a wrongful-death action on February 17, 2023—exactly two years after her death. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the two-year limitations period under Iowa Code section 614.1(9)(a) began no later than February 5, 2021, when the estate discovered the injury and its cause. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment ruling. The Court held that Iowa Code section 614.1(9)(a) requires medical malpractice actions, including wrongful-death claims, to be brought within two years of the date on which the claimant knew or should have known of the injury. The estate argued that a wrongful-death claim does not exist until the victim dies and that the limitations period should therefore begin at death. The Court rejected this argument, relying on Iowa’s longstanding treatment of wrongful-death claims as derivative of the decedent’s own injury rather than as independent causes of action that arise only at death. Under this principle, death is treated as a worsening of the victim’s injury, not a new injury that resets the limitations clock. Because the estate discovered the injury and its negligent cause by February 5, 2021, the two-year period expired on February 5, 2023—twelve days before the estate filed suit on February 17, 2023. Justice McDermott authored the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined.

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