Petitions for a writ of certiorari, particularly in criminal cases, are no stranger to this blog. But this week’s opinions from the Court of Appeals include a case that is worth discussing.
State v. Dade concerned North Carolina’s implied-consent offenses such as impaired driving. If a defendant in such a case files a motion to suppress in the district court, the judge is supposed to “set forth in writing the findings of fact and conclusions of law and preliminarily indicate whether the motion should be granted or denied.” If the district court preliminarily determines to grant the motion to suppress, the State can appeal that decision to the superior court. Notably, the district court “shall not enter a final judgment on the motion until after the State has appealed to superior court or has indicated it does not intend to appeal.” By statute, the Court of Appeals has authority to review “[a]n order finally denying a motion to suppress evidence.”
So what happens if the district court never enters its preliminary decision “in writing”? Can there ever be an appealable final judgment?
In Dade, the Court of Appeals said no. A district court judge verbally granted a motion to suppress but did not enter a written order formalizing that oral ruling with written “findings of fact and conclusions of law” as required by the statute. Nevertheless, the State appealed the district court’s oral rendering of its decision to the superior court, where the superior court reversed the district court’s verbal ruling. The district court never entered a final judgment on the motion to suppress. The defendant ultimately entered a plea agreement in superior court but reserved the right to appeal the superior court’s decision on the motion to suppress.
On appeal, the majority held that the district court’s failure to enter a written determination was a jurisdictional deficiency that made every subsequent proceeding in the case null and void. According to the majority, “the superior court erred by proceeding with the de novo hearing without jurisdiction over the matter via a properly noticed appeal.” Similarly, the plea agreement could not be enforced because “the State should have known that its appeal to superior court was improper, the [superior court’s] Order itself was void, and any ruling or findings therein as to defendant’s motion to suppress evidence were unenforceable.”
Normally, without what it considered a properly appealable judgment, the Court of Appeals would have to dismiss the appeal. However, the Court granted the defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari because he had “properly shown that our inability to review the superior court’s Order, due to an oversight by the district court, could allow a violation of his fundamental rights to stand unchallenged.” Thus, upon certiorari review, the majority vacated the superior court’s order, rescinded the plea agreement, and remanded the case to district court for entry of a written preliminary determination on the motion to suppress. The majority did “not consider the merits of the findings” in the superior court’s order.
A dissenting judge agreed with the majority’s analysis regarding appellate jurisdiction and certiorari but would have affirmed the underlying judgment. In the dissenting judge’s view, the statutory requirement for a written preliminary determination is a procedural requirement rather than a jurisdictional one. According to the dissent, the superior court had jurisdiction to review the district court’s determination (in spite of the lack of a written order), the superior court’s suppression order was adequately supported, and therefore the conviction itself (based on the plea agreement) was proper.
What do you think? When does a statutory requirement turn from a procedural rule into a jurisdictional issue? And how does jurisdiction in the appellate division fit in here? After all, appellate jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals is governed by a different statute. If the lack of a written order or final judgment by the district court judge deprives the superior court of jurisdiction, does that likewise deprive the Court of Appeals of appellate jurisdiction?
In addition, does it matter that this was a criminal case? Civil procedure rules 54 and 58 require a written judgment. Thus, the Supreme Court has said that Rule 58 “requires that all civil judgments be in writing.” State v. Oates, 366 N.C. 264, 267, 732 S.E.2d 571, 574 (2012). On the other hand, as Matt and Beth explain in their treatise, “the Supreme Court has rebuffed broad efforts to impose a written order requirement in criminal cases. Instead, it has stated that the window for noticing appeal in criminal cases opens as soon as the trial court orally renders its ruling in open court and does not close until 14 days after entry of any written judgment or order. Indeed, a written order or judgment is not even required in most criminal cases.” Was Dade different because the statute specifically required a written order?
Some things remain murky, but there seem to be at least two practice pointers. For criminal practitioners, the takeaway is to ensure that the district court judge enters a written determination on a motion to suppress. For appellate practitioners, the takeaway is to file a petition for writ of certiorari whenever in doubt about appellate jurisdiction.